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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Morrison'
further limited the reach of the federal commerce power by proceed-
ing according to an interpretive rationale that was partially obscured
in the Court's previous ruling in United States v. Lopez.2 While the de-
cision in Lopez appeared to point toward increasing restrictions on
Congress's legislative authority, Morrison erased nearly all doubts that
the Court intends to reduce federal commerce power to a fraction of
what it had become in the previous sixty years. More specifically, the
interpretive preferences of the Morrison Court squarely threaten fu-
ture congressional attempts to address civil rights violations, as they
have proven unable to provide principled and intelligible judicial
standards for Congress to follow in drafting such legislation. Al-
though Morrison provides perhaps the clearest view yet of the major-
ity's conservative activism in deciding questions of federal power, the
interpretive regime it has chosen already shows signs of its unwork-
ability in the context of our modem national society.
The Morrison majority's inventive revision and re-characterization
of Commerce Clause precedent prompts the need for a fresh histori-
cal review. In Part I, we provide a concise "interpretive history" of
Commerce Clause precedent. Cases are grouped according to the
three dominant interpretive themes the Court has embraced
throughout its history in determining the scope of the Commerce
Clause. In Part II, we demonstrate how the Lopez and Morrison deci-
sions revive and distort these interpretive themes. The Court's pro-
gression from Lopez to Morrison indicates that the conservative major-
. Clerk to the Honorable Franklin S. Van Antwerpen, United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 2000; M.S.E., University of
Pennsylvania, 1997; B.S.E., Duke University, 1996... Clerk to justice Robert G. Flanders,Jr., Supreme Court of Rhode Island. J.D., University
of Pennsylvania, 2000; Ph.D., London School of Economics and Political Science, 1998; B.A.,
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ity is steadily honing a new categorical test as a means to fashion and
preserve a traditional view of state power. In Part III, we briefly dis-
cuss the potential implications of this re-emerging, formalist Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence for civil rights legislation through an
analysis of recent constitutional challenges to existing environmental
laws.
I. DOMINANT INTERPRETIVE RATIONALES OF
COMMERCE CLAUSEJURISPRUDENCE
Supreme Court precedent involving interpretation of the Com-
merce Clause is notable for its blending of competing rationales.
While many Commerce Clause cases owe their resolution in great
part to the surrounding socioeconomic circumstances of the period
in which they were decided,3 it is possible to distill interpretive pat-
terns and contests from this body of precedent. Specifically, our re-
view of Commerce Clause precedent reveals that three recurring in-
terpretive tensions dominate the field. The following is a concise
history of Commerce Clause precedent arranged thematically to
highlight these well-worn tracks of contested interpretation. This in-
terpretive arrangement of precedent provides a clear view of the con-
servative activism of the Morrison majority from a doctrinal perspec-
tive.
4
A. Gibbons and Cooley
Any history of Commerce Clause jurisprudence would be fatally
flawed without including an analysis of the most important case to
address the subject. At any given point in history, much of the debate
surrounding the interpretation of the Commerce Clause can be
traced to the case of Gibbons v. Ogden, decided in 1824. ' That single
decision, authored by Chief Justice Marshall, contains many of the
seeds of interpretive tension that have flowered into the competing
rationales that reverberate in today's cases. For those who wish to
' Bruce Ackerman's discussion of the "constitutional crisis of 1937' is an excellent example
of this kind of argument. See generafly 1 BR('CEACKMER.%LN, WETHE PEOPLE40-57 (1991).
Before embarking on this thematic historical review, one point descres emphasis. The
following discussion is not an attempt to highlight and organize every doctrinal tool or term of
art employed by the Court to resolve Commerce Clause questions. Any student who has studied
the Commerce Clause is aware that the Court over the years has applied certain conclusive la-
bels that do no more thanjustify the result to be reached in a given case. Perhaps tie most ob-
vious of these is the oft-remarked distinction between -direct' and "indirect- effects. Srz, e.g,.
A.LA. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495. 546 (1935) (concluding that in-
trastate acts that directly affect interstate commerce are subject to federal regulation. whereas
those that only indirectly affect interstate commerce are not). These kinds of discutsioss are
usually accompanied by one or more of the interpretive rationales discussed below. Se text in-
fra Part I.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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loosen the reins and allow Congress "plenary" authority in exerting
its commerce power, Gibbons provides the rhetorical cover to do so.
For those who would restrict Congress to certain subject matter cate-
gories and permit the states to share in regulating activities with
commercial effects, Gibbons can also be useful.
The facts of Gibbons are well known and can be recapitulated
briefly.6 The New York legislature had granted Robert Livingston and
Robert Fulton an exclusive license to navigate steamboats on New
York waters. These licenses were later assigned to John Livingston,
and then again to Aaron Ogden. Ogden's license gave him the ex-
clusive privilege to navigate the waters between Elizabethtown, New
Jersey and New York City. Thomas Gibbons operated two steamboats
in violation of Ogden's grant. When Ogden sued Gibbons in the
New York Court of Chancery to enjoin his operation, Gibbons de-
fended by arguing that his ships were licensed by an Act of Congress
passed in 1793. This federal statute, Gibbons claimed, allowed him to
operate his ships notwithstanding the New York legislative grant. The
Court of Chancery disagreed and granted the injunction. New York's
"Court of Errors" (the court of last resort in the state at that time) af-
firmed. On appeal, with ChiefJustice Marshall writing for the Court,
the Supreme Court reversed, holding that Ogden's grant must yield
to Gibbons's congressionally authorized license.
Today, Gibbons is a case for all seasons. Those like Justice Souter
point to Gibbons as the emblem of a "plenary" conception of com-
merce power.8 Chief Justice Marshall provided sweeping phrases for
his description of the scope of the commerce power. The power to
regulate interstate commerce, he wrote, is the power "to prescribe
the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all
others vested in congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
constitution."9 After Marshall declared the plenary nature of con-
gressional power over interstate commerce, he reinforced this notion
by explaining that the constitutional system imposed only a singular
governor upon its exercise:
The wisdom and the discretion of congress, their identity with the peo-
ple, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are,
in this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war,
the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its
abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must often rely solely,
in all representative governments.10
When breathing meaning into the word "commerce," Marshall
6 See id. at 1-3.
7 See id. at 24 ("[T]he concurrent power of the states, concurrent though it be, is yet stibor-
dinate to the legislation of congress.").
See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1766 (SouterJ., dissenting).
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196 (emphasis added).
W Id. at 197.
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provided an expansive term, specifically ignoring a limiting, categori-
cal construction:
The counsel for the appellee would limit [the term 'commerce"] to traf-
fic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of commodities, and do not
admit that it comprehends navigation. This would restrict a general
term, applicable to many objects, to one of its significations. Commece,
undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more-il is inlercourse. It describes
the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all
its branches, and is regulated by prescribing rules for carring on that in-
tercourse. The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating com-
merce between nations, which shall exclude all laws concerning naviga-
tion, which shall be silent on the admission of the vessels of the one
nation into the ports of the other, and be confined to prescribing rules
for the conduct of individuals, in the actual emplo)7nent of buying and
selling, or of barter."
Marshall's treatment of the constitutional term "among" is simi-
larly broad: "The word 'among' means intermingled with. A thing
which is among others, is intermingled Aith them. Commerce
among the states, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each
state, but may be introduced into the interior." '2
Earlier in the opinion, Marshall provided additional support for a
"plenary" view of federal commerce power when he explicitly es-
chewed a "strict construction" of Article I powers.! Finally, and per-
haps most importantly for congressional supporters, Marshall ex-
plained that the very history that generated the Constitution
transformed the nature of the constituent states:
[W]hen these allied sovereigns converted their league into a govern-
ment, when they converted their congress of ambassadors, deputed to
deliberate on their common concerns, and to recommend measures of
general utility, into a legislature, empowered to enact laws on the most
interesting subjects, the whole character in which the stales appear, underwet a
change, the extent of which must be determined I , a fair consideration of the in-
strument by which that change was effectei
Given language such as that found in the preceding passages, it is
hardly surprising that the expansive decisions of the New Deal era
looked to Marshall's Gibbons opinion as having construed the Com-
merce Clause with "a breadth never yet exceeded. "  Even those with
conflicting interpretations generally conceded the theoretical direc-
tion of his opinion. 6
" Id. at 189-90 (emphasis added).
" Id. at 194.
l at 188.
Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942).
'6 See, eg., County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U.S. 691. 699-700 (1880) (Field.J.) Iln the
opinion of the court in Gibbons v. Ogden, the first and leading case upon the construction of the
commercial clanse of the Constitution, and which opinion is recognized as one of the ablest of
the great ChiefJustice then presiding, there are several expressions which would suthcate, and
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Gibbons, however, has also been read in a far more restrictive
manner. For the definition of "commerce," Marshall provides a suc-
cinct alternative to "intercourse": "The word used in the constitution,
then, comprehends, and has been always understood to comprehend,
navigation within its meaning; and a power to regulate navigation, is as
expressly granted, as if that term had been added to the word 'com-
merce. ' 7 Full stop. 8  Marshall's definition of "among" is also two-
headed. "It is not intended to say," Marshall says of regulating com-
merce among the several States,
that these words comprehend that commerce, which is completely inter-
nal, which is carried on between man and man in a state, or between dif-
ferent parts of the same state, and which does not extend to or affect
other states.... Comprehensive as the word "among" is, it may very
properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more states than
19one.
For those who seek to restrict federal power, however, the true
importance of Gibbons lies in its cogent statement of a traditional
theoretical understanding of a written constitution. It is this tradi-
tional understanding, and its use by subsequent generations ofjurists,
to which we now turn.
The Court has decided many Commerce Clause questions along
one basic interpretive fault line. One side of this interpretive divide
proceeds from the basic fact that the Constitution is a written docu-
ment.2 0 Because the Constitution specifically enumerates certain
powers of Congress in Article I, that enumeration implies the exclu-
sion of subjects not mentioned.' On this view, Article I's grant of
power " [t] o regulate Commerce... among the several States" implies
a congressional inability to regulate subjects not included within that
textual grant. Marshall put it this way in Gibbons- "The enumeration
presupposes something not enumerated; and that something, if we
regard the language or the subject of the sentence, must be the ex-
his general reasoning would tend to the same conclusion, that in his judgment the grant of the
commercial power was of itself sufficient to exclude all action of the States; and it is upon them
that the advocates of the exclusive theory chiefly rely...
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 193 (emphasis added).
Marshall also explains that the historical practice of the national government, as well as
the language of a companion clause of Article I, section 9, supports the "commerce means
navigation" argument. See id. at 190-93; see also U.S. CONST. art I, § 9 ("No preference shall be
given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of Ano-
ther .... ").
' Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194 (emphasis added).
The other side of this interpretive divide is discussed below. See infra Part I.D.
$2 This first proposition has a distinguished pedigree; its roots stretch back to James Madi-
son's Federalist No. 45 and even further as a basic common law canon of statutory interpreta-
tion: inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (I.
Cooke ed., 1961) ("The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Gov-
ernment, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are nu-
merous and indefinite.").
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clusively internal commerce of a state."2 From this perspective then,
perhaps the most important task for the Court in interpreting the
Commerce Clause is to police the perimeter and establish subject-
matter categories that are excluded from the textual grant and there-
fore beyond the reach of Congress. In fact, the categorization of
those characteristics that inhere in the presumptively excluded sub-
ject-matter of Commerce Clause regulation describes much of the
history of the Court's interpretation of the clause. Gibbons, the case
to describe the commerce power with a "breadth never yet ex-
ceeded," was also the first case to explicitly suggest this restrictive in-
terpretive method. In short, just what is interstate commerce is dem-
onstrated best by showing what is not interstate commerce, by being
something that is inherently "non-commerce.
In cases that followed Gibbons, the Court used this argument to
limit the broader readin of Marshall's opinion. Justice Field in
County of Mobile v. Kinball,4 for example, dismissed the plenary theory
of federal commerce power embedded in Marshall's Gibbons opinion
as dicta and declared that Marshall himself ias a are of this fact.
Notwithstanding the language of plenary authority by Marshall, Field
noted that Marshall
takes care to observe that the question [of state authority] was not in-
volved in the decision required by that case. "In discussing the question
whether this [commerce] power is still in the States," he observes that,
"in the case under consideration, we may dismiss from it the inquiry,
whether it is surrendered by the mere hrant to Congress, or is retained
until Congress shall exercise the power.
For Field, Gibbons answered only whether a state could regulate
foreign and interstate commerce when Congress had addressed the
subject at issue.26 Field then pointed to cases that followed Gibbons
(including one that was penned by Marshall himself) to reinforce the
point that the existence or absence of federal legislation w%-as the criti-
cal inquiry for resolving these kinds of controversies.-
What this limitation of Gibbons effectively meant for those like
Field was that the first case to decide what subject matter and regula-
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194-95.
" Of course, since the constitutional grant includes two meaningful terms. this kind of in-
terpretation by opposition can also be achieved by showing an activity to be intrinsically -local,:
or otherwise not inherently "among the several States." The history of this kind of interpretive
maneuver is discussed below. See infra Part I.C.
102 U.S. 691 (1880) (Field,J.).
Id. at 700 (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 200).
See i4. (stating that all Marshall had determined in Gibbons %%as 'that the grant of po-wer by
the Constitution, accompanied by legislation under it. operated as an inhibition upon the
States from interfering with the subject of that legislation").
See id at 700-01 (quoting Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co.. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245. 252
(1829) (Marshall,J.) ("If Congress had passed any act which bore upon the case... we should
not feel much difficulty in saying that a State law coming in conflict with such act would be
void.")); see also License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
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tions Congress might address and employ under its commerce power
was really Cooley v. Board of Wardens, not Gibbons. Cooley, decided in
1852, involved a Pennsylvania statute that required any vessel enter-
ing or leaving the port of Philadelphia that did not employ a local pi-
lot to pay a fee.29 This state regulation was challenged as interfering
with Congress's authority.
In resolving this question, Justice Curtis's Cooley opinion suggested
for the first time that the scope of the federal commerce power
should be determined by the nature of the subject being regulated rather
than by any semantic interpretation of the constitutional textual
grant itself.-" The regulation concerning pilotage, Curtis explained,
dealt with a subject that was of national concern: "Conflicts between
the laws of neighboring states.., might be created by state laws regu-
lating pilotage, deeply affecting that equality of commercial rights, and that
freedom from state interference, which those who formed the Consti-
",3'tution were so anxious to secure ....
Perhaps more important still, the Cooley Court upheld the Penn-
sylvania law, even while conceding that it dealt with a subject-navi-
gation-admittedly within the scope of federal commerce power. In
doing so, the Court addressed the contention that the states were di-
vested of the power to legislate on the subject by the very existence of
the federal power.3 3  "The grant of commercial power to Congress,"
Curtis explained, "does not contain any terms which expressly exclude the
states from exercising an authority over this subject-matter.""' Given
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). There were, of course, cases after Gibbons and yet before
Cooley that restricted the federal commerce power. See Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 102, 107 (1837) ("Because congress has the power to regulate commerce, it is not as a
consequence, that it is an exclusive power."); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 572 (1849)
("[T]his power in the state is not taken away by the power ceded to Congress."). Important as
these cases may be, however, their reasoning was skewed by issues of slavery that lay beneath
their surface.
Cooly, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 311-13.
In reading Curtis's opinion, one is reminded of the contemporary debate between Justice
Antonin Scalia and Ronald Dworkin on the general subject of interpretation. See ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 116-18, 144-49 (1997) (discussing the differences be-
tween "semantic intention" and "expectation intention").
Cooly, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 317 (emphasis added).
See id. at 315, 321 ("That the power to regulate commerce includes the regulation of navi-
gation, we consider settled.... [However w]e are of opinion [sic] that this state law was en-
acted by virtue of a power, residing in the state to legislate. ... ").
" See id. at 318 ("[W]e are brought directly and unavoidably to the consideration of the
question, whether the grant of the commercial power to Congress, did per se deprive the states
of all power to regulate pilots."). Interestingly, the Cooley Court treated the question, notwith-
standing Gibbons, as one of first impression. See id. ("This question has never been decided by
this court.. ").
" Id. (emphasis added). Curtis also relied on Federalist No. 32 as authoritative support in
favor of a non-exclusive conception of federal commerce power. See id. at 318-19; see also TI IF
FEDERALIST No. 32, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed., 1961) ("But as the plan of the
Convention aims only at a partial Union or consolidation, the State Governments would clearly
retain all the rights of sovereignty which they had before had and which were not by that act
exclusively delegated to the United States.").
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this textual silence, Curtis provided a test to determine whether the
states were permitted to regulate an area within the scope of the fed-
eral commerce power. Once again, the subject matter of the regula-
don was the touchstone for resolving the issue. Curtis reasoned:
[W]hen it is said that the nature of the [commerce] power requires that
it should be exercised exclusively by Congress, it must be intended to re-
fer to the subjects of that power, and to say they are of such a nature as to
require exclusive legislation by Congress. Now the power to regulate
commerce, embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but exceed-
ingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively de-
manding a single unform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the
United States in every port; and some like the subject now in question, as
imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities of
navigation. ... Wh'latever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or
admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of
such a nature as to require exclusive legislation 0, Congress. That this cannot be
affirmed of lawsfor the regulation of pilots and pilotage is plain.'
Curtis based his ultimate conclusion that the Pennsylania pilot-
age law was not a subject "demanding a single uniform rule," and
therefore did not fall within Congress's exclusive domain, on an in-
terpretation of a 1789 federal statute declaring "(ti hat all pilots in the
bays, inlets, rivers, harbors, and ports of the United States shall con-
tinue to be regulated in conformity with the existing lawxs of the
states... until further legislative provision shall be made by Con-
gress."36 This statute, "plainly" for Curtis, u-as "a clear and authorita-
tive declaration by the first Congress" that the subject at issue -as in-
herently "local" and thus "should be left to the legislation of the
states," notwithstanding the existence of a subsequent federal statute
that authorized precisely the conduct prohibited by the Pennsylvania
law.
3 7
Cooley created a rival legacy to Gibbons in Commerce Clause inter-
pretation that still resonates today. First, Cooley confirmed that the
nature of the subject being regulated determines the scope of the fed-
eral commerce power (whether Congress could properly legislate
upon a given subject at all). Second, the exclusivity of congressional
authority in a given subject area depended upon whether that subject
demanded a "uniform rule" or required "diversity" to meet "local ne-
cessities. "38 Both components of the Curtis opinion gained sharper
Cooley, 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319 (emphasis added).
Id. at 317 (quoting Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 54).
Id. at 317, 319.
It Subsequent cases reiterated this reasoning. Sm e.g., Henderson v. Mayor of Neu York.
92 U.S. 259, 272 (1875) (holding that a state statute "imadeld) die domain of legituion hich
belong[ed] exclusively to the Congress"); NVelton v. Missouri. 91 U.S. 275. 282 (1875) (stating
that "commercial power continues until the commodity has ceased to be the subject of dis-
criminating legislation"); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867) (striking down a state
tax levied when individuals entered the state); Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713,
743 (1865) ("Congress has regulated the navigation of this river, and ... die State law... is in
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contours in the years to come.
B. Categorization
1. "Non-Commerce"
Cooley's focus on subject matter as a potential touchstone for
Commerce Clause interpretation was a harbinger of things to come.
Cases after Cooley focused on subject matter to determine their out-
come. One of the earliest examples of this distilled method of inter-
pretation is Paul v. Virginia.9 Paul was a test case financed by the Na-
tional Board of Fire Underwriters to challenge the protectionist taxes
and license fees states imposed against nonresident fire and life in-
surance companies in the nineteenth century. Seeking to preempt
the states from regulating any aspect of interstate insurance sales,
lawyers for the insurance industry argued that such sales were trans-
actions in interstate commerce."
Unanimously, the Supreme Court ruled against the insurance in-
dustry and sustained the state regulatory scheme. The case is not as
important for its result as it is for its reasoning,4 because in rejecting
the industry's argument, the Court erected a clear category of "non-
commerce":
The defect of the [insurance industry's] argument lies in the character of
their business. Issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce.
The policies are simple contracts of indemnity against loss by fire, en-
tered into between the corporations and the assured, for a consideration
paid by the latter. These contracts are not articles of commerce in any proper
meaning of the word.4 2
While Justice Field's decision also emphasized the inherently "lo-cal"natu e o th e e • 43
cal" nature of these transactions, there can be no doubt that the de-
cision depended heavily upon the categorical exclusion of insurance
policies as something other than "commerce."
About two decades after Paul, the Court decided Kidd v. Pearson,"
a case involving a Commerce Clause challenge to an Iowa statute that
prohibited the manufacture of liquor for shipment outside the state.
As in Paul, the Court unanimously sustained the state law, and the
conflict with those regulations, and therefore is void.").
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
Id. at 171-74. The industry's attorneys also argued that corporations were "citizens" cov-
ered by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.
" See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (overruling
Paul and holding that fire insurance companies that conducted substantial parts of their busi-
ness across state lines were engaged in interstate commerce).
'2 Pau4 75 U.S. at 183 (emphasis added). On the general tension between "semantic inten-
tion" and "expectation intention" in legal interpretation, see SCALIA, supra note 30, at 116-18,
144-49.
" Pau4 75 U.S. at 183; see also infra Part I.C.
128 U.S. 1 (1888).
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significance ofJustice Lamar's opinion of the Court for the future of
Commerce Clause interpretation cannot be overstated. Justice
Lamar's conclusion that the Iowa statute did not trespass upon the
federal commerce power is almost completely based upon a succinct
categorical exclusion:
No distinction is more popular to the common mind, or more clearly ex-
pressed in economic and political literature, than that between manufac-
tures and commerce. Manufacture is transformation-the fashioning of raw
materials into a change of form for use. Thefuinaions of comimerce are differ-
ent. The buying and selling and the transportation incidental thereto constitute
commercme and the regulation of commerce in the constitutional sense
embraces the regulation at least of such transportation.,'
For Justice Lamar then, "commerce" did not begin until "manu-
facture" was at an end. In making this interpretive move, Lamar re-
lied in part on Justice Field's definition of "commerce among the
several States" in Kimball46 decided eight years earlier. Compare
Field's formulation: "Commerce with foreign countries and among
the States, strictly considered, consists in intercourse and traffic, in-
cluding in these terms navigation and the transportation and transit
of persons and property, as well as the purchase, sale, and exchange
of commodities."4 7 Even viewing Field's definition as comprehensive
of the subject, Lamar's Kidd opinion represents a further extension of
the interpretive technique of subject matter categorization in Com-
merce Clause cases.
Perhaps the case most often cited as an illustration of the inter-
pretive technique of categorical exclusion is E.C. Knight, Co. v. United
States.' In 1892, the American Sugar Refining Company controlled
nearly all sugar refining in the United States. The federal govern-
ment filed suit to challenge the combination under the new Sherman
Antitrust Act.49 The issue was whether the Sherman Act %%as a lawful
exercise of the commerce power and could reach and suppress the
sugar refining monopoly. Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for seven
other members of the Court (only Justice John Marshall Harlan dis-
sented), declared that "[c]ommerce succeeds to manufacture, and is
not a part of it," and held that the Sherman Act could not be lawfully
applied to suppress a monopoly of the manufacture of refined
sugar. Fuller relied heavily on the Kidd decision for support."'
Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
102 U.S. 691,697 (1880).
Id. at 702.
' 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
m 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
E.C. Knight, Co., 156 U.S. at 12.
5 Id. at 14-16. It is also worth noting here that the interpretive regime of fornal categorics
did not always translate into a defeat for federal authority. Two years after Kidd, another Iowa
statute banning the importation (as opposed to manufacture) of liquor was struck down. See
Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 119 (1890) ([Tlhe grant of the power to regulate commerce
among the States... is exclusive, the States cannot exercise that power idthout the asent of
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Three years after E.C. Knight was decided, Congress passed the
Erdman Act to prevent disruption of interstate commerce by labor
strife. The Erdman Act protected union membership by prohibiting"yellow dog" contracts and making it a criminal offense to discharge
or blacklist employees for union activity." William Adair fired an
employee because of his union membership and challenged the Act's
constitutionality.5' Justice Harlan's majority opinion in Adair v. United
States 4 struck down the Act as both an invasion of the Fifth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause and beyond the scope of congressional
commerce power. 5 In his discussion of the scope of the commercepower, Harlan's opinion represents legal formalism in ascendancy:
But what possible legal or logical connection is there between an em-
ploy6's [sic] membership in a labor organization and the carrying on of
interstate commerce? Such relation to a labor organization cannot have, in it-
self and in the eye of the law, any bearing upon the commerce with which the em-
ployi [sic] is connected by his labor and services. Labor associations, we as-
sume, are organized for the general purpose of improving or bettering
the conditions and conserving the interests of its members as wage-
earners-an object entirely legitimate and to be commended rather than
condemned. But surely those associations as labor organizations have nothing to
do with interstate commerce as such.
Of course, in an era where judicial activism runs so rampant that
the Erdman Act is held to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, it is hardly surprising that the Court would hold that
legislation concerning union membership was excluded from the
federal commerce power.
The same brand of formalism reared its head again in 1935 when
the Court struck down the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934 in Rail-
road Retirement Board v. Alton R.R. Co. 57 Justice Roberts's opinion is
remarkable for its explicit rejection of the assumptions and connec-
tions that the Adair Court dealt with only implicitly-namely, that leg-
islation aiming to regulate the morale and well-being of the employ-
ees of an interstate transportation industry was not "commerce." The
Railroad Retirement Act "established a compulsory retirement and
pension system for all carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce
Act." 5 8 While superficially suggesting that the Court was not question-
ing the "means" by which Congress sought to regulate interstate
commerce, Justice Roberts reasoned that the Act was "really and es-
sentially related solely to the social welfare of the worker" and there-
Congress.").
' 30 Stat. 424 (1898).
' SeeAdair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
SId.
Id.
Id. at 178 (emphasis added).
5, 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
Id. at 344.
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fore not "in any just sense a regulation on interstate transportation.";
This interpretive maneuver would prev-ail until the w%,atershed of
1937. 0
2. "Currents," "Channels, "and "Instrumentalities"
Not all of the Court's attempts at categorization resulted in re-
stricting the scope of federal commerce regulation. In fact, much of
the Court's Commerce Clause precedent stands squarely for the
proposition that some types of conduct are, by their very nature, inter-
state activity.
Perhaps Swift & Co. v. United States provides the best illustration of
an enlarged but still theoretically limited brand of categorization."'
Swift involved an injunctive antitrust action against meat dealers from
several states. Together, the Swift defendants controlled roughly 60%
of the national meat market. They argued that the targeted activities
were entirely intrastate. Justice Holmes wrote the Court's opinion in
Swift, upholding the injunction on behalf of a unanimous Court.
Holmes's Commerce Clause discussion begins with rather sweeping
statements, distinguishing E.C. Knight and its excluded commerce
category of "manufacture": "Here the subject matter is sales and the
very point of the combination is to restrain and monopolize com-
merce among the States in respect of such sales."
But Holmes did not simply rely on the categorical comparison of
"manufacture" and "sales" to authorize the government's suit against
conduct that was conceded to be taking place within only a single
state. Rather, Holmes erected an entirely new category to encompass
and define the practical elements of interstate business. "[C]ommerce
among the States," he wrote,
is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the
course of business. When cattle are sent for sale from a place in one
State, with the expectation that they will end their transit, after purchase,
in another, and when in effect they do so, with only the interruption
necessary to find a purchaser at the stock yards, and when this is a typical,
constantly recurring course, the rurrent thuts existing is a current of ommTrce
among the States, and the purchase of the cattle is a part and incident of
such commerce.63
Although this language, in one sense, rivals the notion that rigid
formal categories can be utilized to determine the limits of permissi-
ble interstate commerce regulation, it really stands as a pragmatic
variant of the same interpretive technique. The true theoretical rivals
"Id. at368.
See, eg., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 303 (1936) (excluding 'miutig" and
"production" from the constitutional meaning of"commerce").
61196 U.S. 375 (1905).
Id. at 397.
Id. at 398-99 (emphasis added).
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to the categorization of inherently and exclusively "interstate" activity
as such are cases like United States v. Wrightwood Dairy, Co."' These
cases usually invoke the Necessary and Proper Clause and authorize
intrastate exertions of the federal commerce power as an "appropri-
ate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execu-
tion of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce." 5 The
Wrightwood Dairy concept, taken to its extreme, does not deem any
conduct or activity as "not interstate" in character beforehand. Every
transaction, no matter how "internal" or "local," is potentially subject
to regulation that is an "appropriate means to the attainment of a le-
gitimate" interstate commercial end.
Swift, instead, shares theoretical footing with Kidd, not Wrightwood
Dairy. Like Kidd and its employment of the "manufacturing" label,
Holmes's "current of commerce" theory in Swift is an attempt to for-
mally categorize intrinsically interstate activity as such. Though admit-
tedly deviating from the purely formalist course that characterized
much of the jurisprudence of the day, and despite providing greater
latitude for federal regulation than previous formulations, Holmes's"current of commerce" theory attempts to characterize inherently in-
terstate conduct. Swift and its progeny effectively rejected the notion
that the single-state operation of certain transactions would remove
an entire series of transactions with national scope and impact from
federal reach.6 In doing so it went far to categorize the elements of
such an inherently "interstate" transactional series.
Entire lines of Commerce Clause precedent represent an implicit
categorization of certain subject matter as "interstate commerce" by
its very nature. Cases in the early twentieth century involving the rail-
roads, manifesting the need for uniform national regulation, are
perhaps the most obvious exampleY.6  Recently, in United States v. Lo-
pez, the Court referred to these railroad cases as involving the "chan-
nels" or "instrumentalities" of interstate commercefs Many early
cases, however, employed precisely the kind of formal categorization
so far discussed.
6 315 U.S. 110 (1942) (involving the regulation of milk prices where the milk was trans-
ported interstate to the market).
Id. at 119.
See, e.g., Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 516 (1922) (upholding the Packers and Stock-
yards Act of 1921, which "treat[ed] the various stockyards of the country as great national pub-
lic utilities to promote the flow of [interstate] commerce").
67 See Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago B. & Q.R. Co., 257 U.S. 563 (1922) (affirming an inter-
locutory injunction enjoining the Railroad Commission of Wisconsin from meddling with the
intrastate passenger fares set by the Interstate Commerce Commission); Texas & Pacific Ry. v.
Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916) ("Congress may, in the exercise of the plenary power to regulate
commerce between the States, require installation of safety appliances on cars used on highways
of interstate commerce .... ."); Southern Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) (uphold-
ing Congress's safety regulation of vehicles on highways that carried interstate commerce).
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (striking down the Gun Free School
Zone Act in part because the Court found no nexus between guns and interstate commerce).
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Shortly after the Civil War, for example, the Court applied the
categorization technique in Coe v. Town ofErrol," an early "instrumen-
tality" case (to borrow the modem term). In that case, Edward Coe
(and other residents of Maine and Massachusetts) owned logs that
were cut and stored in New Hampshire to be transported out of state
and sold. Coe challenged New Hampshire statutes assessing state
taxes on the cargo, arguing that the statutes must yield to the federal
commerce power since the logs were intended for export among the
states.
Justice Bradley's opinion for the Court sustaining the state taxes
represents a classic example of the technique of categorical exclu-
sion. Bradley first explained that goods "in course of transportation
through a State" should be deemed "already in the course of com-
mercial transportation," and that they are "clearly under the protec-
tion of the constitution."0 Further, such goods would also be outside
of state regulatory control "when actually started in the course of
transportation to another State, or delivered to a carrier for such
transportation."7' But, for Bradley and his brethren, Coe's logs did
not fall into either of these categories. Bradley was searching for the
temporal line where such cargo "cease[s] to be governed exclusively
by the domestic law and begin[s] to be governed and protected by
the national law of commercial regulation. For the Coe Court,
goods crossed into the national realm only when "they commence [d]
their final movement for transportation from the State of their origin
to that of their destination."" The "process of exportation" did not
begin until the goods were "committed to the common carrier for
transportation out of the State to the State of their destination, or
have started on their ultimate passage to that State."
4 Before goods
reached that point, Bradley wrote, "it is reasonable to regard them as
not only within the State of their origin, but as a part of the general
mass of property of that State, subject to its jurisdiction, and liable to
taxation there."'5 Unfortunately for Edward Coe, his logs had not yet
begun the "process of exportation" and were therefore subject to the
New Hampshire taxes. 6
Bradley's resort to such formalism in Coe is all the more remark-
able given that he needed to steer clear of the Constitution's express
prohibition of taxes on exports.'7 Bradley himself was of the view that
116 U.S. 517,517 (1886) (upholding tie application of state taxes on goods 'inended for





76 Id. at 528.
=See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, di. 5 (prohibiting any tax or duty to be Iaid on articles exported
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any kinds of duties imposed on exports from one state to another"would be a regulation of commerce among the States, and there-
fore, void as an invasion of the exclusive power of Congress. '  Bradley
negotiated this hurdle by explaining that, while the New Hampshire
taxes could not stand if they were imposed because these goods were
intended for export, there was no evidence that Coe's logs were taxed
with this purpose in mind. Bradley's search for a clear rule was moti-
vated in part by the fear of including the intent of the producer as a
factor in Commerce Clause analysis and thereby depleting chief
sources of revenue. 9 "It seems to us untenable," Bradley wrote, "to
hold that a crop or herd is exempt from taxation merely because it is,
by its owner, intended for exportation. If such were the rule in many
states there would be nothing but the lands and real estate to bear
the taxes."
8 0
The commencement of "the process of exportation" as a touch-
stone of federal reach represents another attempt to formally catego-
rize activity that inherently resists such treatment."' Seen in this way,
cases like Coe are a precursor for those early twentieth century cases
involving federal legislation prohibiting the interstate shipment of
various "social evils." Legislation such as the Lottery Act, the Pure
Food and Drugs Act, and the Mann Act were each upheld by the
Court as permissible regulations of interstate travel by relying on pre-
cisely the same notion of categorization that motivated the Coe
Court.
8 2
Of course, the categorization of "movement" was no match for the
judicial activism of the early twentieth century. In Hammer v. Dagen-
hart, for example, Justice Day quickly disabused the country of the
from any state).
Coe, 116 U.S. at 526 (emphasis added).
' It is also noteworthy that Bradley, in making this claim, relied on the precedent of Brown
v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827), and its "original package" doctrine to determine
the point where state jurisdiction over commodities begins and ends. See Coe, 116 U.S. at 526-
27. The "original package" doctrine held that the taxing power of a state does not extend to
imports from abroad so long as they remain in their original packaging. This doctrine was lim-
ited in later cases such as Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. 123 (1869), and Michelin Tire Corp. v.
Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976), and wvas rejected by the Court entirely as a limit on the commerce
power in United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948).
Coe, 116 U.S. at 527-28.
Another early case highlighted both the "instrumentality" and "channel" of commerce
categories, with the Court sustaining the application of a federal safety inspection to a ship
which operated solely on a Michigan river and engaged only in intrastate business. See The
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1870).
' See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1916) (upholding the White Slave Traffic Act
ofJune 25, 1910); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding the White Slave Act);
Hipolite Egg Co., 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (affirming a decree to confiscate adulterated eggs pursu-
ant to the Food and Drugs Act); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding the Lot-
tery Act). This "embargo theory" of congressional power over interstate transportation was
viewed by some members of the Court at the time as so complete that even the Tenth Amend-
ment did not pose an obstacle. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277-81 (1918)
(Holmes,J., dissenting).
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notion that the commerce power "incidentally includes the authority
to prohibit the movement of ordinary commodities."" Instead, Day
re-characterized the "movement" cases and created another category
to suit his purposes. He re-interpreted earlier "movement" cases to
stand for the proposition that certain exertions of the commerce
power, to be lawful, must have an "evil" as their target.'
In each of these instances the use of interstate transportation w%-as ncm-
sary to the accomplishment of harnful results. In other words, although the
power over interstate transportation was to regulate, that could onl) be ac-
complished by prohibiting the use of the facilities of interstate commerce to effect the
evil intended.
For Day and his brethren in the majority, of course, child labor
was not the sort of "evil" comparable to lottery tickets, prostitution, or
impure food or drugs, so the statute was struck down."' Without
question, Hammer symbolizes an active inquiry into legslative pur-
pose; it also stands as an emblem of willful categorization.
C. "Traditional State Functions"
Along with erecting categories of "non-commerce" or inherently
"non-interstate" subject matter, early Commerce Clause precedents
also reinforced the notion that certain regulatory areas were inher-
ently "local" in nature and therefore were left for exclusive state regu-
lation regardless of their "commercial" character. In 1837, in the
case of Mayor of New York v. Miln,'" the Court applied a potent "inher-
ently local" rationale to permit state regulation of vessels admittedly
operating on interstate waterways.'4 Miln involved a local ordinance
requiring ship masters to post security for indigent passengers, re-
move undesirable aliens from the ship, and provide passenger mani-
fests. In upholding the ordinance, the Court invoked traditional
state "police powers" as a sufficient ground for states to regulate the
contents of vessels travelling on interstate waters." The denomina-
tion of the ordinance as a "police" regulation grew from its perceived
purpose-the control of population and immigration flows. The
Court held that these subjects, unlike commerce, were "complete,
Hammer, 247 U.S. at 270.
Id. at 270-71 (citing with approval Clark Distilling Co.v. Western Marland R%,. Co.. 242
U.S. 311 (1917), Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917). Hoke v. United States, 227
U.S. 308 (1913), Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. ,15 (1911). Champion v. Ames. 188
U.S. 321 (1903)).
Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
Id at 277.
r'Justice Holmes's dissent in Hammer issued this precise concern: "The notion that prohibt-
tion [of movement between states] is an), less prohibition when applied to things now thought
evil I do not understand." Id at 280 (Holmes,J., dissenting).
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unqualified, and exclusive" areas for the states to regulate."'
Thirty-two years later, in United States v. Dewitt, the Court relied
heavily upon Miln and its "inherently local" rationale and struck
down a federal commercial statute as beyond the commerce power
for the first time. Dewitt involved the Internal Revenue Act of 1867,
which made it a misdemeanor to sell "illuminating oils" made from
petroleum. Deeming the statute a "regulation of police," the Court
followed the logic of cases like Cooley and Miln with a vengeance: "As
a police regulation, relating exclusively to the internal trade of the
States, it can only have effect where the legislative authority of Con-
gress excludes, territorially, all State legislation.... Within State lim-
its, it can have no constitutional operation."9'
This rationale of "inherently local" subject matter is similar to the
other methods of categorization already discussed but is a potentially
more potent variant. While classifying certain subjects as "non-
commerce" may limit federal regulation in one way, the "inherently
local" view has the potential to thwart federal regulation that con-
cerns "interstate commerce" on its face. In short, the "inherently lo-
cal" or "reserved rights of the States" rationale bars federal regulation
not because Congress lacks affirmative power to enact it but because
it trespasses upon traditional notions of state sovereignty.'7 This ra-
tionale ultimately rests upon a theory of federalism and a specific in-
terpretation of the Tenth Amendment.
96
Carter v. Carter Coal Company,97 decided in 1936, demonstrates the
full implications of the "inherently local" method of reasoning. Carter
Coal involved the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, which
established a collective bargaining mechanism for miners to negoti-
ate acceptable hours and wages. Writing for the majority, Justice
Sutherland struck down the Act, explaining that while labor strife in
the coal industry might have a large impact upon interstate com-
merce,
the conclusive answer is that the evils [targeted by the Act] are all local
91 Id. at 139.
76 U.S. 41 (1869).
Id. at 45.
Id.
See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 84046 (1976) (acknowledging the
limits on Congressional power when state sovereignty is at stake); United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 68 (1935) (finding that the Agricultural Adjustment Act "invades the reserved rights of
the states"). But see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 159 (1992) ("In the end, just as a
cup may be half empty or half full, it makes no difference whether one views the question at
issue in these cases as one of ascertaining the limits of the power delegated to the Federal Gov-
ernment under the affirmative provisions of the Constitution or one of discerning the core of
sovereignty retained by the States under the Tenth Amendment.").
See U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple.").
298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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evils over which the federal government has no legislative control. The re-
lation of employer and employee is a local relation. At common law, it is one of
the domestic relations.... And the controversies and evils, which it is the ob-
ject of the act to regulate and minitnize, are local controversies and evils affecting
local work undertaken to accomplish that local result. Such effect as they may
have upon commerce, however extensive it may be, is secondary and in-
direct. An increase in the greamess of the effect adds to its importance.
It does not alter its character s
While Sutherland also noted the well-worn distinction between
"production" and "commerce," his opinion is more important for its
view that the Tenth Amendment governs the commerce 
power.
The year after the Carter Coal decision, the Court's activism waned
and it began to defer to Congress in deciding Commerce Clause
questions. It was not until 1976 that the rationale of Cooley and Miln
again emerged, when the Court struck down the wage and hours pro-
visions of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") as applied to state
and municipal employees in National League of Cities v. Use' The
National League of Cities decision marked a dramatic resurgence of a
Tenth Amendment barrier to federal power. The National League of
Cities majority, in an opinion written by (then) Justice Rehnquist, did
not question the constitutional basis of the FLSA under the Com-
merce Clause." Rather, Rehnquist's opinion was a paean to tradi-
tional notions of state sovereignty while conceding the "plenary" con-
ception of the federal commerce power.'O Although Rehnquist did
not disturb a single Commerce Clause precedent, the FLSA w%,as
Id. at 308-09 (emphasis added).
I. at 299-301.
Id. at 295. Justice Sutherland wrote:
The determination of the Framers Convention and the ratif)ing convenions to preserve
complete and unimpaired state self-government in all matters not committed to the gen-
eral government is one of the plainest facts which emerge from the history of their de-
liberations. And adherence to that determination is incumbent equally upon the federal
government and the states. State powers can neither be appropriated on the one hand
nor abdicated on the other.
Id. Cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 699 (2000) (SouterJ.. dissenting) (commenting
that the states, as a result of the present case and Carter Coal, ill be -forced to enjoy the new
federalism whether they want it or not").
Decided the year before the "constitutional revolution of 1937," Carter Coal was handed
down less than two months after United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). Though not directly
addressing the commerce power, Justice Roberts's Butler opinion remains perhaps the most
controversial exemplar of Tenth Amendment strictures on federal regulation. Srz Buler 297
U.S. at 68.
... 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
z" The FLSA was unanimously upheld as a vaid exercise of the commerce pmoer in runted
Statesv. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
SSee National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 836 ("Whatever their motive and purpose. regula.
tions of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional prohibition are ithin the p!,narv
power confened on Congress ly the Commerce Clause." (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100.
115 (1941) (emphasis added))); id. at 840 ("It is established beyond peradenture that the
Commerce Clause of Art. I of the Constitution is a grant of plenary authority to Congress." cit-
ing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824))).
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struck down on the ground that it "impermissibly interfer[ed] with
the integral governmental functions" of the states. 0. In doing so, the
National League of Cities Court overruled the Tenth Amendment the-
ory of Maryland v. Wirtz,'°5 decided only eight years earlier. '
Rehnquist explained that "the States as States stand on a quite differ-
ent footing from an individual or corporation when challenging the
exercise of Congress's power to regulate commerce."'' 7 Because the
FLSA sought to regulate "traditional aspects of state sovereignty," the
Tenth Amendment stood as an independent constitutional barrier.
Justice Brennan's dissent in National League of Cities'08 opened by
citing Gibbons, Wickard v. Filburn,'°9 and Federalist No. 31 for the
proposition that "[a] t the beginning Chief Justice Marshall ... made
emphatic the embracing and penetrating nature of [Congress's
commerce] power by warning that effective restraints on its exercise
must proceed from political rather than from judicial processes." ''
Brennan argued that the Gibbons conception of the commerce power
was limited only by restraints "prescribed in the constitution" and
that "there is no restraint based on state sovereignty requiring or
permitting judicial enforcement anywhere expressed in the Constitu-
tion."' Brennan was careful to point out that "regulations that this
Court can say are not regulations of 'commerce' cannot stand" but
that no argument of that kind was being made regarding the FLSA."'
Borrowing language from Wirtz and United States v. California" to
make his point, Brennan continued in terms that would reverberate
decades later:
[W]hile the commerce power has limits, valid general regulations of
commerce do not cease to be regulations of commerce because a State is
involved. If a State is engaging in economic activities that are validly regulated
by the Federal Government when engaged in by private persons, the State too
may be forced to conform its activities to federal regulation."
The Tenth Amendment regime inspired by National League of Cit-
Id. at 851.
392 U.S. 183 (1968).
1W7irtz upheld the application of minimum-ivage and overtime-pay requirements of the
FLSA to state and municipal employees. 1Wrtz exemplified the largely unquestioned prevailing
view (for almost four decades after 1937) that the rights of the states provided no judicially.
enforceable limits on congressional power.
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854.
Id. at 856-80 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
,,o 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
' Id. at 857-58 & n.1.
.. Id. at 858; see also id. at 859 ("The sovereign power of the states is necessarily diminished
to the extent of the grants of power to the federal government in the Constitution.... [TI he
power of the state is subordinate to the constitutional exercise of the granted federal power."
(quoting United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 184 (1936))).
"' Id. at 859.
"' United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
.. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 861 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (em-
phasis added).
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ies did not last. After roughly a decade of attempting to distinguish
"traditional" and "essential" governmental functions from those of a
lesser order, the Court overruled National League of Cities in Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority."5 Echoing Brennan, Justice
Blackmun explained that "the attempt to draw the boundaries of
state regulatory immunity in terms of 'traditional governmental func-
tion' is not only unworkable but is also inconsistent with established
principles of federlism ....6
D. "Substantial Effects" and Legislative Deference
To this point, we have been discussing only one side of the basic
interpretive divide concerning the Commerce Clause. Arguments re-
flecting an alternative interpretive approach achieved nearly
hegemonic status during the period from 1937 until 1995. This
dominant interpretive regime opposed the formalist, subject-matter
conception that characterized nineteenth and earl), twentieth century
Commerce Clause decisions. Born out of the "constitutional crisis" of
1937, a spate of decisions emerged deferring to congressional judg-
ment and easing prior restrictions on the scope of the commerce
power."' Argued one week after President Roosevelt submitted his
court-packing plan, the Court's decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp."8 signaled a sea-change in judicial attitude towards federal
legislation. The case involved the constitutionality of the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), which guaranteed the right of work-
ers to organize unions. The NLRA applied both to businesses operat-
ingin interstate commerce and to those whose activities affected inter-
state commerce; it also prohibited employers from discriminating
against their employees because of their union activities.
Leading with cases like Kidd and Carter Coal, Jones & Laughlin ar-
gued that applying NLRA provisions to employees engaged in "pro-
... 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (finding that the Commerce Clause allowed congressionid enforce-
ment of the FLSA in this case, because it did not impinge upon state sovereign imniunit or any
constitutional provision).
"' I& at 531.
"1 We do not attempt to add to the scholarship that has been devoted to the revolution of
1937." Professor Bruce Ackerman has explained that this period is of such findamental struc-
tural importance to American constitutional democracy that it rises to de Iesel of a constitu-
tional amendment, notwithstanding the formal requirements of Article V. See grswrally 1
ACKERMAN, supra note 3.
". 301 U.S. 1 (1937). While Jones & Laughlin is rightly regarded as the crucial break from
prior Commerce Clause precedent, Solicitor General Seth Wxtnan recently expluned that the
seeds for the decision were sown earlier that year. Sre Seth vaxman, 77e Pinsus oJ P u rion:
Arguing the New Deal 88 GEO. LJ. 2399 (2000). See also, eg.. Kentucky Whip & Collar Co %. Illi-
nois Cent. R_ Co., 299 U.S. 334 (1937) (upholding Ashurst Sunners Act making it unlawful to
transport in interstate commerce goods made by convict labor); Virgimi-m R. Co. %. Svitem Fed-
eration No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937) (upholding collective bargaining proisions of the Raihas
Labor Act as applied to "back shop" employees).
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duction" was beyond the scope of the commerce power."9 The gov-
ernment countered that the corporation's steel products were part of
a "stream of commerce," with the manufacturing plant as a single fo-
cal point within that stream. In upholding the NLRA, the Court
went far beyond the government's "stream of commerce" argument,
and the core of Chief Justice Hughes's opinion for the Court formed
the basis for much of the regulation of the modern industrial welfare
state. "The congressional authority to protect interstate commerce
from burdens and obstructions," Hughes wrote,
is not limited to transactions which can be deemed to be an essential part
of a flow of interstate or foreign commerce. Burdens and obstructions
may be due to injurious action springing from other sources. The fun-
damental principle is that the power to regulate commerce is the power
to enact "all appropriate legislation" for "its protection and advance-
ment;" to adopt measures "to promote its growth and insure its safety;"
"to foster, protect, control and restrain." That power is plenary and may
be exerted to protect interstate commerce "no matter what the source of
the dangers which threaten it." Although activities may be intrastate in char-
acter when separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation
to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that
commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to
exercise that control
121
With that rhetorical flourish, the "substantial effects" test was
born. Yet like Marshall before him, Hughes did provide a refuge of
sorts for those who would restrict the federal commerce power by
immediately following this expansive passage with a few lines of limi-
tation. "Undoubtedly the scope of this power," he explained,
must be considered in the light of our dual system of government and
may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce
so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex so-
ciety, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national
and what is local and create a completely centralized government.2
This rather nebulous limitation would prove useful to a future ac-
tivist majority.
2 3
After the Court handed down cases like Jones & Laughlin in 1937,
the New Deal recovery program received a green light. Subsequent
applications of the "substantial effects" principle to other forms of re-
covery legislation proved just how much the Court was willing to de-
fer to Congress. In its 1941 decision in United States v. Darby,' the
Court upheld the FLSA, affirming and solidifying the theory behind
Jones & Laughlin. The minimum wage and maximum hours provi-
,, See Jones & Laughltin, 301 U.S. at 34.
See id. at 35 (citing Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495 (1922)).
Id. at 36-37 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
"' Id. at 37.
£2 See infra Part II.B; United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
" 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (upholding restrictions on the production of goods under FLSA).
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sions of the FLSA applied to all employees "engaged in commerce or
in the production of goods for commerce." The FLSA embodied the
same principle that had doomed the Child Labor Act in Hammer-
Congress's attempt to close the channels of interstate commerce for
purposes of social welfare. This time, however, the Court sustained
the legislation unanimously and explicitly overruled Hammer.";
The importance of Darby to later interpretations of the Commerce
Clause cannot be overstated; Justice Stone's opinion confirmed four
major propositions regarding the scope of the commerce power that
still resonate today. First, Stone reaffirmed the plenary conception of
the commerce power and stated that its ambit "can neither be en-
larged nor diminished by the exercise or non-exercise of state
power."' Next, he declared that the motive and purpose of federal
commerce legislation "are matters for the legislative judgment upon
the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over
which the courts are given no control." -7 Third, Stone turned to the
application of FLSA provisions to the workers themselves and severely
limited Carter Coal by permitting regulation of wholly intrastate activ-
ity in order to affect an entire intestate industry.'" Fourth, Stone
held that the Tenth Amendment posed no obstacle and rejected the
notion that it rendered certain subjects beyond federal reach:
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not
been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adoption to sug-
gest that it was more than declaratory of the relationship between the na-
tional and state governments as it had been established by the Constitu-
tion before the amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay
fears that the new national government might seek to exercise powers
not granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their
reserved powers.'
Uncertainty surrounding the precise coverage of the FLSA would,
as noted above, provoke controversy in National League of Cities and
Garcia decades later. In the 1940's, however, Darby's broad strokes
provided ample support for much federal legislation. The following
year, in Wckard v. Filburn,'s the Court demonstrated the full extent of
its deferential convictions. This time the vehicle %-as the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1942 and the application of its quota schedule,
under which the government imposed a 49-cent penalty for every
bushel yielded by unauthorized planting. Filburn challenged the as-
sessment, arguing that the provisions could not extend to his per-
sonal wheat production and consumption.





317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding Congressional quotas on farming products as %thin the
scope of its commerce power).
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Justice Jackson wrote for a unanimous (and almost entirely Roose-
velt-appointed) Court in upholding the assessment. The Wickard
Court concluded both that "questions of the power of Congress are
not to be decided by reference to any formula which would give con-
trolling force to nomenclature.., and foreclose consideration of the
actual effects of the activity in question upon interstate commerce"'3'
and that the Court's "recognition of the relevance of the economic
effects in the application of the Commerce Clause ... has made the
mechanical application of legal formulas no longer feasible.' ',3  It
went on to demonstrate the breadth of Congress's commerce power
by explaining that it "is not confined in its exercise to the regulation
of commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intra-
state which so affect interstate commerce ... as to make regulation of
them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end."1"
Finally, the Wickard Court removed all doubts as to its broad interpre-
tation of the commerce power and its disinterest in the nature of the
regulated activity when it explained that such activity "may still, what-
ever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial eco-
nomic effect on interstate commerce."'
Jones & Laughlin, Darby, and Wickard formed the foundation upon
which Commerce Clause decisions would rest for the next six dec-
ades. When the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 were challenged in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States 35 and Katzenbach v. McClung,3 6 the Court relied upon the "sub-
stantial effects" and "rational basis" tests of earlier cases to uphold the
legislation. 37 From Jones & Laughlin until United States v. Lopez,"'
Congress could regulate under its commerce power in two distinct
ways. First, it could set regulations or conditions concerning inter-
state travel as long as it did not violate a specific constitutional guar-
antee. Second, it could regulate any activity that had a "close and
substantial relationship" to, or effect upon, interstate commerce.
"' Id. at 120.
" Id. at 123-24.
" Id. at 124.
Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
" 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding Title II on the ground that Congress's power to regulate
interstate commerce extended to prohibiting racial discrimination by motels toward travelers).
" 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (upholding Title II based on Congress's rational basis for finding that
restaurants' refusal to serve blacks obstructed interstate commerce).
'17 Because much of our argument focuses upon the potential impact of current Commerce
Clause interpretation on federal civil rights legislation, we provide a more detailed discussion of
Heart of Atlanta and McClungin Parts II and III below.
' 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun Free School Zone Act was beyond Congress's
commerce power because the subject of the Act did not arise out of or have a connection to
commercial transactions that substantially affected interstate commerce).
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II. UATTED STATES V. LOPEZAND (JATfED SmmE V. MiORwsoN
This deferential approach to Commerce Clause legislation came
to an abrupt halt in 1995, when the Court in United States v. Loptz
altered its philosophy and struck down the Gun Free School Zones
Act' ("GFSZA"), making it the first statute in nearly sixty years to be
overturned for being outside the bounds of congressional commerce
power. Despite a clearly established trend of evaluating statutes in
terms of whether Congress acted rationally in finding that the regu-
lated activity substantially affects interstate commerce,"' the Lopez
Court instead focused on whether the regulated activity uas eco-
nomic in nature or belonged to an area of the law that %as tradition-
ally reserved to the states.' This shift toward old doctrinal trends w%-as
139 Id
. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1990).
" See infra Part II.A.1.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,560,561 n.3 (1995). Two other cntera tere also
cited as relevant to the Court's determination in Lop= (1) the absence of express congressional
findings regarding the relationship between gun possession in schools and interstate com-
merce, and (2) the lack of an express jurisdictional element in the statute. i.e. a clause litning
the GFSZA's regulated activity to the possession of guns that had already traveled in interstate
commerce. See id. at 561-63.
Although Lopez seemed to imply that congressional findings accompanying future legisla-
tion would alter the Court's Commerce Clause analysis, see ut at 563 (i[Tlo the extent that
congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the legislative judgment that te actiity in
question substantially affected interstate commerce ... they are lacking here."). that analstical
tool was virtually destroyed in Aorfison. The Mornison Court invalidated the VAWA despite the
presence of substantial congressional findings. See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740.
1752 (2000) "("[Section] 13981 is supported by numerous findings regarding the serious im-
pact that gender-motivated violence has on victims and their families."); i&L at 1763 ('Indeed.
the legislative record here is far more voluminous than the record compiled by Congress and
found sufficient in two prior cases upholding Tide II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against
Commerce Clause challenges.") (Souter, J., dissenting). The Court instead concentrated on
the non-economic nature of the regulated activity. SeMorrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752 ('[TJhe exis-
tence of congressional findings is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain tie constitutionalit) of
Commerce Clause legislation."). As a result, congressional findings seem to no longer repre-
sent a viable means ofjustifying federal legislation under the commerce power, at least uisen
regulating "non-economic" activity. This signifies the end of any sort of 'rational basis' stan-
dard for congressional commerce authority. Nevertheless, as the Momson Court circumscribed
(if not eviscerated) the presence of findings as a criterion for upholding Commerce Clause leg-
islation, a discussion of that criterion is beyond the scope of our present analysis. Brt smr 1d. at
1778 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("IT]he legislative process leading up to enactment of [the
VAWA].. . Ear surpasses that which led to the enactment of the statute We considered in Lo-
pez... [a]nd that distinction provides a possible basis for upholding the law here.'1.
The role of ajurisdictional element in federal Comnerce Clause legislation is likewisc not
discussed here because its part in establishing a statute's constitutionality is sommehat unclear
and is relevant to too narrow a class of statutes. It appears from both Lop, and Morrison that
the presence of a jurisdictional element is a strong indication to die Court that a statute is
within Congress's commerce power. See Lopr, 514 U.S. at 561-62 (referring to a jurisdictional
element as something that would ensure that possession of a flrearin affects interstate com-
merce"); Mormison, 120 S. CL at 1752 n.5 (mentioning that the VA'Xs criminal provision. 18
U.S.C. § 2261 (a) (1), contains a jurisdictional element that has been uniforml, upheld). Tus
conclusion is somewhat muddled, however, by the facts of die two cases. Although die GFS7--X
did not contain an express jurisdictional element. the vast majority of guns in circulation have
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magified by the Court's subsequent decision in United States v. Moni-
son, which further limited the scope of congressional power by rely-
ing heavily on the non-economic nature of the regulated activity to
overturn the civil rights provision of the Violence Against Women Act
("VAWA").l44 This reliance may forecast doom for a wide array of fu-
ture federal legislation, as it represents both the Supreme Court's re-
cent development of stricter standards of review for Commerce
Clause statutes and the Court's desire to promote state autonomy
generally, even at the expense of nationally beneficial federal legisla-
tion.
traveled in interstate commerce. See Bradley A. Harsch, Brzonkala, Lopez, and the Commerce
Clause Canard: A Synthesis of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 29 N.M. L. REV. 321, 327 (1999) ("In
any event, most guns move in interstate commerce so the effect of the [GFSZA] would be much
the same despite ajurisdictional nexus."). Similarly, nearly all victims of gender-motivated vio-
lence are, at some point, interstate travelers. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994),
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.CA.N. 1839, 1853 (finding that gender-motivated violence "deter[s] po-
tential victims from travelling interstate"); S. REP. No. 103-138, at 54 (1993) (concluding that
gender-based crimes restrict movement). These facts ostensibly eliminate the need for an ex-
press jurisdictional element; the requirement that guns or victims of gender-motivated crime
travel interstate is satisfied by virtue of the realities of the firearms market and modern trns-
portation. The Lopez and Morrison Courts nevertheless considered the lack of express language
in overturning the respective statutes, ignoring the fact that an express jurisdictional element
was practically unnecessary and clouding the role such a provision should play in determining a
statute's constitutionality under the Commerce Clause. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-62 (focusing
on the fact that no express jurisdictional element is present); Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751-52
("Like the Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in Lopez, § 13981 contains no jurisdictional ele-
ment establishing that the federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress's power to regu-
late interstate commerce.").
Statutes containing express jurisdictional elements are also by definition limited in their
scope-by their own terms they regulate purely interstate activities. The Supreme Court in
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), however, made it clear that Congress's commerce
power was not limited to purely interstate activities: "The power of Congress over interstate
commerce is not confined to the regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those
activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress
over it as to make regulation of them appropriate .... " Id. at 118. Since the Court has not
suggested that Darby be overruled, it has apparently recognized that requiring a jurisdictional
element in all commerce statutes would improperly eliminate Congress's power over intrastate
activities. But see Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1759 (Thomas,J., concurring) (advocating the elimina-
tion of the substantial effects test). The presence of ajurisdictional element has instead been
considered sufficient, but not necessary, to establish constitutionality under the Commerce
Clause. See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751-52 (explaining that ajurisdictional element would "lend
support" to the constitutionality of the VAWA, but refraining from making such a provision it
prerequisite); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 (finding that ajurisdictional element "would ensure" the
GFSZA's constitutionality, but failing to condition such a finding on the presence of a jurisdic-
tional requirement). Since our inquiry focuses on the future of civil rights statutes generally, a
detailed discussion ofjurisdictional elements does not encompass a sufficiently broad range of
potential federal legislation so as to be crucial to our analysis.
120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
.' See42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994); Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751 ("[T]he proper resolution of the
present cases is clear. Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase,
economic activity.").
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A. Lopez and the Attempt to Limit Congressional Commerce Power:.
Old and New Doctrinal Trends
1. "Economic Activity"
The commerce doctrine prior to Lopez was based strictly on the
notion that a statute was valid under the Commerce Clause if Con-
gress had a rational basis to determine that the regulated activity sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce.' Despite claiming to adhere
to this deferential standard of review, 4" the Lopez Court effectively dis-
regarded it in favor of focusing on the commercial nature of the
GFSZA's regulated activity. The Court concluded that, since all of
the controlling cases involved regulation of activity that it considered
economic in nature, the rational basis test must implicitly subject only
economic activity to congressional authority."'7 As a result, it refor-
mulated its standard to require that Congress regulate "economic act i-
ity [that] substantially affects interstate commerce.""" It then relied
on this reformulation to strike the GFSZA on the grounds that the
statute did not govern such activity.' 9 The Lopez Court's reasoning,
however, was unsupported by controlling precedent; none of the
cases it cited as examples of Congress governing economic activity ac-
tually relied on the nature of the regulated activity in making their
decision.)u The Court simply resurrected an old practice of employ-
" See, e-g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964) (requiring that Congress regu-
late an activity having a "substantial economic effect on interstate commerce"): Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (recognizing that Congress may regulate
activities "having a direct and substantial relation to [interstate] commerce'); Wickard v. Fi
burn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that an activity may be regulated by Congress if it "ex-
erts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce"); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 118 (1941) (finding that an activity may be regulated under the commerce power if it 'af-
fect[s] interstate commerce"); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1. 37 (1937)
(holding that intrastate activities with a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce
are within Congress's commerce power).
" United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (acknowledging that since 1942 the
Court has "undertaken to decide whether a rational basis existed for concluding that a regu-
lated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce").
" The Lopez majority cited, among others, Ii1durd v. Filburn, Heat of Atlanta Alkel, Inc. 1'.
United States, and Katzenbach v. McClung as examples of cases challenging statutes that passed
Commerce Clause scrutiny due to their focus on economic activity. See Lcp- 514 U.S. at 559-
60.
Ild. at 560 (emphasis added).
1 See id. at 561 ("Section 922(g) ... by its terms has nothing to do ith 'commerce* or any
sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define those tcerm.); td. at 567 (-The
possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic activity. ...").
" See, e-g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294. 302 (1964) (requiring that Congress regu-
late an activity having a "substantial economic effect on interstate commerce'); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (recognizing that Congress may regulate
activities "having a direct and substantial relation to [interstate] commerce"); Wickard v. Fi-
burn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that an activity may be regulated by Congress if it "ex-
erts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce").
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ing inevitably vague and artificial distinctions"' to restrict Congress's
commerce power and, in turn, promote principles of state autonomy
and federal non-intervention.
For example, the Lopez majority cited the Agricultural Adjustment
Act in Wickard v. Filburn52 as legislation that survived the rational basis
test by virtue of its regulating economic activity. 13 It claimed that the
Act in Wickard was appropriately upheld and that the GFSZA should
correspondingly be struck, because the growing of wheat is an "eco-
nomic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a school zone is
not. While this distinction between growing wheat and possessing
guns may be accurate, the Lopez Court's decision nevertheless misrep-
resented the analysis actually employed by the Court in Wickard. As
we have already discussed, the Wickard Court explicitly eschewed reli-
ance upon "any formula which would give controlling force to no-
menclature" in its deferential application of the substantial effects
test, and it explained that an activity "may still, whatever its nature, be
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on in-
terstate commerce." 55  Notwithstanding the Lopez Court's contrary
view, whether the production of wheat for personal use is an "eco-
nomic" activity was simply immaterial to the Wickard Court's decision
to uphold the Act.'
5 6
Two later cases further reveal the lack of precedential support for
the "nature-of-the-regulated-activity" categorization employed in Lo-
pez. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States'57 and Katzenbach v.
McClung,'58 the Court upheld Tide II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as
it applied, respectively, to places of lodging and to restaurants. The
Lopez majority insisted that in both cases the Court upheld Title II
based on the economic nature of the regulated industries.'59 In fact,
the Heart of Atlanta Court found that Title II regulated racial dis-
crimination generally, not simply the hospitality industry, and spoke
repeatedly about motives and rationales for upholding the statute
that did not depend on the "economic" nature of such discrimina-
tion. The Court relied on the fact that "Title II is carefully limited
.. For an explanation of the history and types of distinctions mentioned, see supra Part l.B.
'' 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (claiming that "[e]ven Wickard... involved economic activity").
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120, 125 (emphasis added).
See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1768 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting)
("Wickard applied the substantial effects test to domestic agricultural production for domnestic
agricultural consumption, an activity that cannot fairly be described as commercial. ..
379 U.S. 241 (1964).
379 U.S. 294 (1964).
M See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559 (referring to the regulated activity in Title II as "inns and hotels
catering to interstate guests" and "restaurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies").
'0 SeeHeart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 250 ("[Tlhe fundamental object of Title II was to vindicate'the deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public
establishments.'").
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to enterprises having a direct and substantial relation to the interstate
flow of goods and people.""" It considered the "burdens that dis-
crimination by race or color places upon interstate commerce": ,and
the "disruptive effect[s] [of] racial discrimination.""' The Court's ul-
timate decision to uphold Tide II rested on a determination of
"whether Congress had a rational basis for finding that racial discrimi-
nation.., affected commerce."" None of these reasons for sustain-
ing Tide II are contingent upon the statute's regulated activity being
"economic" in nature.
Similarly, the Court in McClung upheld Tide II because Congress
acted rationally in determining that racial discrimination substantially
affects interstate commerce'ta Instead of analyzing the economic na-
ture of the statute's regulated activity, the McClung Court referred to
the "burdens placed on interstate commerce by racial discrimination
in restaurants.""6 The Court recited four main consequences of ra-
cial discrimination that it found to substantially affect interstate
commerce: (1) that "established restaurants in such areas [where dis-
crimination occurred] sold less interstate goods because of the dis-
crimination, [2] that interstate travel was obstructed directly by it, [3]
that business in general suffered and [4] that many new businesses
refrained from establishing [in these areas] as a result of [racial dis-
crimination].""6' Like those in Heart of Atlanta, none of the reasons
offered by the Court in McClung mentioned in any way the economic
nature of racial discrimination; they instead focused on the comercial
results of such discrimination and concluded that those results consti-
tuted a sufficient basis for upholding Tide II.V "
The Lopez majority misapplied controlling Commerce Clause
precedent in order to narrow the category of activity reachable by
federal commerce legislation. Neither 117diard, nor Heart of Atlanta,
nor McClung considered the nature of the regulated activity (eco-
SId. at 250.
Id. at 252.
It. at 257 (emphasis added). The Heart of Atlania Court conidered both the qualtamue
as well as quantitative effect [of racial discrimination] on interstate trael by Negroes." Id. at
253. It found the former to be the "obvious impairment of the Negro tra~eler's pleasure and
convenience," and the latter the "effect of discouraging travel." I.
It. at 258 (emphasis added).
See McClung, 379 U.S. at 304 (relying on tie fact that Congress 'had a rational bwss for
finding that racial discrimination in restaurants had a direct and adverse effect on the free flow
of interstate commerce").
" Id. at 299. Among these burdens, the Court found that racial discrimination wus an "arti-
ficial restriction on the market," it at 299, and had a "direct and highly restrictihe effect upon
interstate travel by Negroes," it. at 300.
' See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 628 (BreyerJ., dissenting) (-Although tie inajonty today attempts to
categorize... McClung and 1ickard as involving intrastate 'economic activin." the Courts that
decided each of those cases did not focus upon the economic nature of the activty regulated.
Rather, they focused upon whether that activity affected interstate or foreign commerce.").
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nomic or otherwise) relevant to its Commerce Clause analysis.' G The
majority's argument in Lopez that an activity must be "economic" in
nature to satisfy the rational basis test is therefore merely an attempt
to justify the curtailment of congressional power in spite of existing
precedent.17
0
2. Traditional Area of State Concern
The Lopez majority did not, however, strike down the GFSZA ex-
clusively because of the non-economic nature of its regulated activity.
The Court criticized the statute for regulating non-economic activ-
ity7 and for interfering with existing criminal laws, an area it consid-
ered traditionally reserved for state control.1 72 Lopezjustified the in-
validation of the GFSZA in part because it "foreclose[d] the States
from experimenting and exercising their ownjudgment in an area to
which States lay claim by right of history and expertise.' 77 Because it
legislated conduct "already denounced as criminal by the States," the
Court was concerned that upholding the GFSZA would "effect[] a'change in the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal
' SeeJulie Goldscheid, United States v. Morrison and the Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence
Against Women Act: A Civil Rights Law Struck Down in the Name of Federalism, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
109, 134 (2000) ("[T]he Heart of Atlanta and McClung decisions reveal that the Court was con-
cerned with the impact of private discrimination on the economy, not on whether the conduct
itself was economic or non-economic.").
"o See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 608 (Souter,J., dissenting) (highlighting the "inconsistency of this
[economic/non-economic activity] categorization with our rational basis precedents from thelast 50 years"). Justice Souter went on in his dissent to criticize the majority decision for relying
on prior discarded logic in creating
a backward glance at both the old pitfalls, treat[ing] deference under the rationality rule
as subject to gradation according to the commercial or noncommercial nature of the
immediate subject of the challenged regulation. The distinction between what is pat-
ently commercial and what is not looks much like the old distinction between what di-
rectly affects commerce and what touches it only indirectly.
d.71 See id. at 561 (striking down GFSZA, in part, because the possession of guns in school
zones has "nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise").
' See id. at 561 n.3 (citing Brecht v. Abramson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993) ("States possess
primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law.")). But see Hodel v. Virginia Sur-
face Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (upholding a federal law regulating
strip mining against a state law autonomy challenge); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 195
(1968) ("There is no general doctrine implied in the Federal Constitution that the two gov-
ernments, national and state, are each to exercise its powers so as not to interfere with the free
and full exercise of the powers of the other."); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (up-
holding federal wage and hour law for workers involved in manufacture of goods).
'-' Id. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Interestingly, in Wickard the Court engaged in a
comparative analysis to determine whether the Agricultural Adjustment Act dealt with a subject
properly within the federal government's ken. The Court noted that Great Britain, Argentina,
Australia, and the United States (all nations with federated systems of government), had im-
plemented national price schedules. In all of them, the regulation came from tire national gov-
ernment. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125-26 & n.27. While this kind of reasoning suggests one
method of deciding whether a regulatory scheme is properly nationalized, the Wickard Court
did not suggest that the absence of any comparative analog would have doomed the legislation.
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jurisdiction.'' 74 The Court was similarly persuaded that the GFSZA
must be invalidated because it would "convert congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort re-
tained by the States," thereby eliminating any distinction between
"what is truly national and what is truly local.""' Despite being em-
ployed to strike down the GFSZA, this two-pronged attack on con-
gressional legislative power ironically left open the possibility that a
statute regulating purely non-economic activity could pass Commerce
Clause scrutiny. The GFSZA presented a relatively easy case; it was a
regulation of non-economic activity that clearly duplicated existing
state criminal laws."16 If, however, Congress was careful to regulate
only non-economic activities that were not within traditional areas of
state control, that statute would be clearly distinguishable from the
GFSZA and, potentially, an acceptable exercise of congressional
power under Lopez.17
Lopez represented a change in the active principles behind the
Supreme Court's Commerce Clause doctrine. Whereas the Court
once favored deferring to congressional rationality, after Lopez it ap-
peared to prefer some combination of categorizing "economic" and
"non-economic" activity and protecting states from federal intrusion
into areas of law traditionally within their control. It nevertheless
remained to be seen after Lopez whether the Court's reference to tra-
ditional areas of state law was intended as an alternative Commerce
Clause analysis or merely an additional ground to strike an individual
statute. Although Lopez ostensibly left Congress a loophole through
which it could continue to pass federal legislation of non-economic
activity, the Lopez Court ultimately left its successor to determine
whether congressional power would be limited solely by the nature of
the regulated activity, or whether, by avoiding traditional areas of
state control, Congress could still legislate under the deferential
Commerce Clause doctrine of the previous sixty years.
The Court answered this question, at least temporarily, in United
States v. Morrison,"8 where it further limited congressional commerce
power by effectively relying solely on the nature of the regulated ac-
tivity in striking down the civil rights remedy provision of the
VAWA.' 9 The Morrison Court demonstrated a skepticism about Con-
gress's power to enact national "non-economic" legislation-in par-
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3.
' Id. at 567-68.
See idt at 561 n.3 (claiming that the GFSZA "inappropriately overr[odel legitimate State
firearms laws with a new and unnecessary Federal law").
"'Justice Souter entertained this idea in his dissent in Lope, recognizing that the majority
"gestures toward... other considerations that it might sometime entertain in applying rational
basis scrutiny,"" induding- ""does the congressional statute deal with subjects of traditional state
regulation... ?" Id. at 608-09.
120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
Seeid. at 1751, 17 54.
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ticular civil rights statutes like the VAWA-that bodes poorly for fed-
eral civil rights laws generally.
B. Morrison: Closing the Lopez Loophole
In Morrison the Court advocated local rather than federal regula-
tory power on the grounds that the VAWA, in allowing victims of
gender-motivated violence a federal civil remedy against their attack-
ers,'80 failed to regulate economic activity. "'
The Morrison decision represented a potentially significant trend
toward excluding Congress from important national issues. Although
Lopez departed from the traditional substantial effects test, it still
seemed to leave Congress sufficient latitude to enact civil rights stat-
utes such as the VAWA, provided measures were taken to insulate
state control over areas such as criminal and family law from federal
interference.'8 2 The Morrison Court, however, disregarded the fact
that the VAWA did not interfere with traditional state authority and
invalidated the Act despite its complimentary relationship to admit-
tedly inadequate state laws.'8 3 After Morison, it appears that Congress
only possesses legislative authority over economic activities that sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce, leaving it with its smallest meas-
ure of commerce authority in the last sixty years.
1. Nature of Regulated Activity
The Morrison Court began its analysis of the VAWA by relying on
the nature-of-the-regulated-activity category developed in Lopez. The
Court referred to prior Supreme Court decisions that it claimed "up-
held a wide variety of congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic
activity where [the Court] concluded that the activity substantially af-
fected interstate commerce," ' 84 and "sustained federal regulation of
intrastate activity... [where] the activity in question ha[d] been
some sort of economic endeavor."'85 The Court then criticized and ulti-
mately invalidated the VAWA on the grounds that "[g]ender-
motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, eco-
nomic activity... [and] thus far in our Nation's history our cases
, See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (b)(1994) ("All persons within the United States shall have the right
to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender.")
... See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751 (relying on the nature of the regulated activity as the clear-
est grounds for overturning the VAWA); Goldscheid, supra note 169, at 123.
" See supra Part II.A.2.
, See SenatorJoseph R. BidenJr., The Civil Rights Remedy of the Violence Against Women Act: A
Defense, 37 HARv.J. ON LEGIS. 1, 25 (2000) (describing the VAWA as "narrowly drafted with the
goals of minimizing any such intrusion [into state prerogatives] and maximizing cooperation
between the federal and state governments").
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1750 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).Id. (emphasis added).
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have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only
where that activity is economic in nature.""
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court rejected two lines of rea-
soning that were instrumental in controlling Commerce Clause cases.
It first dismissed the idea that "Congress may regulate none-
conomic... conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect
on interstate commerce." 7 This "aggregate effect" doctrine was de-
veloped in Wickard v. Filburn,' a case that is considered the Court's
broadest interpretation of the substantial effect test' ' and one that
Morrison claimed to follow.' 95  Instead of remaining loyal to the
Wickard Court's finding that, "even if [regulated] activity be local and
though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its
nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic ef-
fect on interstate commerce,"' the Morrison majority effectively
abandoned the substantial effects test and limited the commerce
power to activities that it deemed economic in nature.
The Morrison Court also rejected Congress's formal findings that
gender-motivated violence is a valid subject for federal Commerce
Clause regulation because it substantially affects interstate commerce
by deterring victims from "travelling interstate, from engaging in em-
ployment in interstate business, and from transacting with business,
and in places involved with interstate commerce.""' In doing so, the
Morrison majority seemingly overlooked the fact that Congress's con-
clusion was nearly identical to that relied on by the Court in McClung
to uphold Tide II9 Instead, it again found that the economic nature
of the regulated activity, rather than that activity's effect on interstate
commerce, was the determining factor in deciding a statute's consti-
tutionality under the Commerce Clause. In short, Monison breathed
new life into the Lopez Court's nature-of-the-regulated-activityI catego-
I d.at 1751.
Id. at 1754.
1.. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
" See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549. 560 (1995) (describing l5hard as 'perhaps the
most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate acthits"); Jil L Mar-
tin, Note, United States v. Morrison: Federalism Against the 1111 of the Stars, 32 Loi. U. CiIl. LJ.
243, 267-68 (2000) (referring to Wi7diard as "possibly the most extreme exunple" of the substan-
tiat effect doctrine).
90 See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1750 & n.4 (citing littdard); id. at 1759 (Souter.J.. dissXnting)
(criticizing the majority's reliance on lickard).
TWrkard, 317 U.S. at 125.
Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711. at 385 0l94f1.
" Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300 (1964) (finding that Title 11 substanttiall% af-
fected interstate commerce on the grounds that -established restaurants... sold less interstate
goods because of [racial] discrimination, that interstate travel %as obstructed direeth bi it. that
business in general suffered and that many new businesses refrained from establishing there as
a result"); see also Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1763 (Souter.J., dissenting) ("[Glender-baswd siolence
in the 1990's was shown to operate in a manner similar to racial discrimination in the 196J's tit
reducing the mobility of employees and their production and consumption of good shipped in
interstate commerce."). Compare Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752. with AI&Chung, 379 L'S. at 3110.
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rization by overtly disregarding the substantial effect test 9' in favor of
striking down the VAWA due to the non-economic nature of gender-
motivated violence. 95 More broadly, the Court attempted to abandon
the existing doctrinal trend toward judicial deference to legislative
decisions in favor of imposing substantive categories designed to re-
strain congressional commerce power.l96
2. Traditional Area of State Concern
The Morrison decision further restricted Congress's commerce
authority by casually ignoring the Lopez Court's discussion of whether
a statute interferes in an area of traditional state concern. As men-
tioned above, perhaps the saving grace of the Lapez opinion was that a
statute could seemingly still pass constitutional muster, despite regu-
lating purely non-economic activity,' 97 if it avoided infringing on the
states' power to legislate in certain areas. Although it claimed to ap-
ply the same reasoning as Lopez, the Morrison majority expanded its
definition of "areas of traditional state concern" to include gender-
motivated violence. Such an expansion effectively precludes federal
Commerce Clause legislation with respect to any non-economic activ-
ity and justifies doing so by misconstruing the subject of statutes like
the VAWA and essentially disregarding the role of national civil rights
legislation in our federal system.
" As mentioned in the discussion, supra Part IIA.1, the Morrison Court, like the Lopez major-
ity before it, justified invalidating the VAWA by relying on an essentially irrelevant historical
fact. Regardless of how tirelessly the Lopez and Morrison majorities attempted to give historical
context to the nature-of-the-regulated-activity categorization, the fact remains that their prede-
cessors did not share in their quest. See, e.g., McClung 379 U.S. at 302 (requiring that Congress
regulate an activity having a "substantial economic effect on interstate commerce"); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (recognizing that Congress may
regulate activities "having a direct and substantial relation to [interstate commerce]"); Wickard
v. Filbur, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that an activity may be regulated by Congress if it
"exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce"). The economic nature of the
regulated activity in both the Agricultural Adjustment Act in Wickard and Title 11 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 in Heart of Atlanta Motel was immaterial to the Court's decision to uphold
those statutes. The Wickard, Heart of Atlanta, and McClung Courts simply applied the substantial
effects test; they neither thought the regulated activity was economic in nature nor cared if it
was so long as the subject of the legislation substantially affected interstate commerce.
" See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 n.4 (2000) ("[1]n every case where we
have sustained federal regulation under Wickard[] . .. the regulated activity was of an apparent
commercial character."). But see id. at 1764-65 (Souter,J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's nominal
adherence to the substantial effects test is merely that.... This new characterization of substan-
tial effects has no support in our cases (the self-fulfilling prophecies of Lopez aside), least of all
those the majority cites.").
" For a discussion of the history of such distinctions in the Court's Commerce Clause juris-
prudence, see supra Part I.B.
"' We recognize the difficulties in classifying particular activities as inherently economic or
non-economic. Because we take the position that the distinction is inappropriate, however, fur-
ther treatment of the vagueness of these definitions is beyond the scope of this discussion.
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a. Misconstruing the VAWA 's Subject
The Court in Morrison mistakenly equated the gender-motivated
violence governed by the VAWA with other types of violence that are
traditionally the subject of state criminal law.t' It referred to the
criminal nature of gender-related violence" and pointed out that
such violence often occurs domestically, thereby implicating state
family laws as well. "  It recycled quotations from Lopez discussing the
disappearance of "any limitation on federal power, even in areas such
as criminal law enforcement... where States historically have been
sovereign"" and the potential obliteration of "the Constitution's dis-
tinction between national and local authority." +' Finally, it worried
aloud that upholding the VAWA would represent a license to Con-
gress to regulate any violent crime, including murder, because "gen-
der-motivated violence, as a subset of all other violent offenses, is cer-
tain to have lesser economic impacts than the larger class of which it
is a part."
Contrary to the assertions made by the Morrison majority, however,
the VAWA in no way interfered with state criminal or family law." '
First, the VAWA was not a criminal statute-it provided only a private
civil remedy for victims of gender-related violence. "  More impor-
tantly, the provision of such a remedy required a showing that the vic-
tim was attacked as the result of gender-motivated animus.-i This stan-
dard is a very difficult one to mee' 7 and involves inquiring into the
' See _Morrison, 120 S. C. at 1752-53 (equating gender-motivated violence to other violent
crimes, such as murder, which are traditionally addressed by state law).
Id. at 1753 (referring to gender-motivated violence as merely a "subset of all violent
crime").
Id. at 1752-54.
Id. at 1751 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,564 (1995)).
Id at 1752.
Id. at 1753.
See Goldscheid, supra note 169, at 130 ("The statutory requirement that plaintiffs assert
proof of discriminatory conduct in each case ensures that die law covers a limited category of
conduct that is different in nature from all violent crime or all family law."); Catharine A. MacK-
innon, Disputing Male Sovereignt,: On United States v. Morrison. 114 HFAJt. L REV. 135, 149
(2000) (describing the VAWA as "a federal law that duplicated no state law in theory. design, or
remedy").
See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(a) (1994) (establishing a [flederal civil rights cause of action for
victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender"); Goldscheid, supra note 169. at 111-12
("From a civil rights perspective, it is apparent that the [V'AWA] covers a limited univers--dis-
criminatory conduct .... Had the Court analyzed the statute as civil rights legislation, it should
have upheld the VAWA civil rights remedy as uithin the realm of traditional federal power.").
See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994) (providing a civil remedy for victins of gender.nmwiated
crimes (emphasis added)); Afor-ison, 120 S. CL at 1773 (Souter.J., dissenting) ("The [VAWAI
accordingly offers a federal civil rights remedy aimed exactly at violence against women. as an
alternative to the generic state tort causes of action found to be poor tools of action by the state
task forces.").
SeeJohn S. Baker, Jr., United States v. Morrison and Other Argunptts Aganst Federal "Hate
Cfime"Legislation, 80 B.U. L RE%. 1191, 1210 (2000) ('Adding bias motivation as an element of
a crime does what adding any kind of motivation element does: it makes convicting defendants
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attacker's state of mind in a way foreign to most criminal statutes.""'
While criminal statutes normally focus on questions of intent, the
VAWA's standard of liability required a showing of motive,"' thereby
distinguishing it from other criminal provisions. °
Its gender-motivated animus requirement also ensured that the
VAWA could not be used as a substitute for common domestic vio-
lence crimes.' Domestic violence statutes do not usually require
such a difficult showing of the alleged attacker's state of mind.22  If a
common domestic violence statute were drafted to mimic the VAWA,
the offense would be so difficult to prove that the statute would not
adequately protect potential victims 3--many instances of domestic
abuse that are deserving of state law remedies occur without evidence
of gender-related animus on the part of the attacker .2 " By contrast,
more difficult.").
See id. at 1197-98 ("Making motivation the determinant of the criminal harm redirects the
analysis of criminal law away from the traditional normative focus on the act, the intent, and the
criminal consequences.").
For purposes of our discussion, we mean to differentiate intent from motive in the follow-
ing way. Intent reflects the actor's desired end; for example, an intent to kill reflects a desire
that someone be dead. By contrast, motive, for our purposes, represents the driving force be-
hind the actor's willingness to act in the first place. An actor's motive to attack, for example,
may be hatred or profit. His intent, however, would not be to hate, but rather to inflict a cer-
tain degree of harm upon his victim. While criminal laws traditionally evaluate an alleged per-
petrator's conduct and the intent of his actions, the VAWA focused on the actor's reasons for
attacking, his motive, in addition to his intended outcome. This distinction is important be-
cause it demonstrates a critical difference between criminal provisions, which are typically en-
acted and enforced by the states, and civil rights provisions, which are sometimes passed pursu-
ant to Congress's commerce power. See Baker, supra note 207, at 1210 ("Intention goes to the
mental element to perform the criminal act.., traditionally considered as general intent
and/or to achieve a certain end ... traditionally considered specific intent. Motive, on the
other hand, involves the reasons for the criminal act. Generally speaking, motive does not and
should not matter [in criminal statutes].").
210 This standard is not, however, unusual among civil rights statutes. Requiring gender-
based animus for a grant of relief is analogous to requiring that an employer act on the basis of
race or religion in hiring or firing an employee under Title VII. SeeTitle VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k) (2000). The familiarity of this standard is evidence that the
VAWA is not a particularly unusual brand of federal statute. In Morrison, however, it became
the victim of a contracting Commerce Clause doctrine.
211 See Biden, supra note 183, at 27 ("[B]y enacting a civil rights statute that requires invidious
discriminatory motivation, Congress also avoided creating a 'general federal tort law.'" (citation
omitted)).
212 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-20 (2000) (defining domestic violence in terms of traditional
intent crimes); ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.990 (Michie 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. AiNN. § 13-3601 (West
2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.28 (West 2000); 750 ILL. COmP. STAT. ANN. 60/103 (West 2000);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.720 (Banks-Baldwin 2000); MICH. CO,%IP. LAWS ANN. § 400.1501 (West
2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25 (West 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.010 (West
2000).
2 See Frederick M. Lawrence, The Case for a Federal Bias Crime Law, 16 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1,14,
159 (1999) ("Motive can be difficult to prove in a gender-related crime.").
2'1 See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1753 (referring to gender-motivated violence as a "subset of all
violent crime"); Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 851 (4th Cir. 1999) (find-
ing only that "some portion of this violence [against women], and the toll that it exacts, is at-
tributable to gender animus"), af['d sub nora, Brzonkala v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); id. at
853 n.17 (recognizing that "gender-motivated crime constitutes a relatively small subset of all
[Vol. 3:3
THE NEW COALERCE CLAUSE DOCTRIE
the VAWA addressed a different offense. It was designed to remedy
violations of a victim's right to be free of discrimination due to his or
her gender, an offense that requires an intricate finding of discrimi-
natory motive."5 It did not even attempt to regulate typical instances
of domestic violence. Finally, the VAWA explicitly forfeited its juris-
diction over traditional family law issues, "" thereby further demon-
strating its noninterference with state lawmaking authority.
While the GFSZA was a criminal provision that duplicated and
confused the application of clearly established state law,"' the VAWA
represented a federal solution to a clearly national problem that was
admittedly beyond the capacity of state legislatures and judiciaries to
solve.218 The majority in Lopez struck down the GFSZA because it did
not consider gun possession to be a national problem addressable
solely by federal intervention. 219 The VAWA, however, was supported
by Congress and the Attorneys General from thirty-eight states as a
necessary federal solution to a pressing national issue.' Instead of
upholding the VAWA on the basis that it remedied a nationwide
problem beyond the capabilities of the individual states to address,
the Morrison Court improperly applied Lopez and further restricted
congressional commerce power by finding that the VAWA contra-
vened the interests of federalism through its involvement in areas of
violent crime against women").
2" See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c) (1994) (limiting the scope of the reinedy to "cnne[sl of vio-
lence motivated by gender and thus depriv[ing] another of te right (to be free from such vio-
lence]"); Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1761 n.2 (SouterJ., dissenting) ("ITlhe civil rights rernedy [of
the VAWA] limits its scope to 'crimes of violence motivated by gender'-presumably a Some-
what narrower subset of acts." (citation omitted)).
2" See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e) (4) (2000) (specifically excluding federal -jurisdicuon over any
State law claim seeking the establishment of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of marital
property, or child custody decree"); Biden, supra note 183, at 11 ([T)lle civil rights remedy %-,is
carefully crafted in the very best spirit of cooperative federalism. Congress did not preempt.
invalidate, or duplicate state laws; create an intrusive remedy directly against offending state: or
legislate in areas traditionally reserved to states such as divorce, child custody. or aimon). In-
stead, Congress provided a supplemental remedy for victims that minimally interferes uith state
prerogatives."); idL at 26 ("[Section] 13981 responds to the states' self-described needs without
preempting or interfering with state prosecutions in any way.").
2'7 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3 (noting the federal government's finding that the GFSZL'
"displace[s] state policy choices," and "overrides legitimate State firearms laws" (citation onut-
ted)).
21 See MAnison, 120 S. Ct. at 1772-73 (Souter, J.. dissenting) (observing that "Attornevs Gen-
eral from 38 States urged Congress to enact the Civil Rights Remed%"): Martin. supra note 189,
at 321 ("The uniformity of enforcement that can be achieved through federal legtsation is nec-
essary to make civil rights laws effective.").
..9 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3 (criticizing the GFSZA in pan because it uus an "unnecessan
federal law" in conflict with the States' role as "primary authority for defining and enforcing the
criminal law").
22 See Crimes of Volence Motivated I" Gender. Hearing Before the Sul'comrz. on Civil and Censlitu-
tional Rights of the House Comm. on theJudicia,', 103d Cong. 34-36 (1993); sc' aLso I iolene Agaist
Women: Vitims of the System. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on theJudinar, 102d Cong. 373 (199)1,
(recording a unanimous vote by the National Association of Attorneys General in support of the
VAVA); S. REP. No. 103-138, at 38 (1993) ("The Violence Against Women Act is intended to
respond to ... the resulting failure of our criminal justice system to address such violence.').
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law traditionally reserved to the states.2
b. The VAWA s Special Role as a Civil Rights Statute
The Morrison Court likewise failed to recognize the VAWA's spe-
cial status as a civil rights statute.22 The Court struck down the VAWA
in part for interfering with particular areas of state law that the Court
considered sacred. It did not, however, consider the tremendous so-
cial importance of civil rights legislation in the federal calculus.2 2
Civil rights statutes are often designed to coerce social activity away
from an established but disfavored norm, such as the exclusion of ra-
cial minorities from local restaurants and hotels, 224 and have been
used to mandate new rules of social interaction in spite of contrary
local preferences.2 In short, civil rights laws are readily at odds with
principles of state autonomy. This does not mean, however, as the
Morrison Court seemed to believe, that we should eliminate Con-
gress's power to promote social equity in the name of state auton-
226omy.
On the contrary, Attorneys General from thirty-eight states, the
District of Columbia, and two federal territories expressly requested
federal legislative assistance in combating gender-motivated vio-
"' See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1753 (criticizing the VAWA for interfering in "areas of tradi-
tional state regulation"); id. at 1754 (stating that "[tihe regulation and punishment of intrastate
violence ... has always been the province of the States").
'l See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993) (finding that discriminatory con-
duct "is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm" than nonbiased crimes); Bray v.
Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 348 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (not-
ing federal efforts to expand "federal protection to diverse classes nationwide"); Biden, supra
note 183, at 10-11 ("Section 13981 continues, and is in keeping with, a venerable tradition of
federal civil rights law."); Goldscheid, supra note 169, at 111 ("[I]n enacting the VAWA civil
rights remedy, Congress created a new civil rights law."); id. at 129 ("The [Morrison] Court ig-
nored arguments, fully supported by the legislative record, that Congress sought to regulate .
matter of civil rights, an area in which the federal government has a strong historic and endur-
ing interest."); id. at 131-32 ("[T]he Morrison Court ignored the traditional national interest in
the uniform enforcement of civil rights."); MacKinnon, supra note 204, at 177 (explaining that
the VAWA addressed the fundamental question of female social equality).
' See Goldscheid, supra note 169, at 112 ("Had the [Morrison] Court analyzed the statute as
civil rights legislation, it should have upheld the VAWA civil rights remedy as within the realm
of traditional federal power.").
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000) (Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
See, e.g., id.; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination by employers on the
basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"); 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2000) (prohibiting
state and local literacy tests for voters). See also MacKinnon, supra note 204, at 149-50 (arguing
that when civil rights legislation is enacted to remedy the "historic exclusion of a subordinated
group from the legal system," "it is inadequate to respond that the laws on the subject have
been this way for some time").
' The Commerce Clause is not, of course, the sole vehicle for passage of civil rights legisla-
tion. However, with the Court's recent rulings in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000), and Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000), it appears that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment is limited to regulating state action. As a result, the Commerce Clause remains a
primary source of federal regulation of private conduct.
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lencess? and "nearly three-quarters of the states joined a brief urging
the [Morrison] Court to uphold the [VAWA]."" The Supreme Court
has similarly acknowledged the importance of civil rights legislation.
In both Heart of Atlanta and McClung, the Court upheld civil rights
statutes without apparent concern for their potential duplication of,
or interference with, state law." The Heart of Atlanta Court recog-
nized, with respect to Title II's prohibition of racial discrimination,
that "[t]here is nothing novel about such legislation," citing numer-
ous similar state and municipal laws outlawing discrimination in
places of public accommodation.' Rather than give the Court
pause, however, such duplication acted as justification for the stat-
ute's validity as an effective means of protecting minority rights; state
autonomy took a back seat, in the Court's eyes, to the need to combat
discrimination that substantially affected interstate commerce.' A
similar set of circumstances existed in McClung, in which the Court
recognized that some activities were necessarily within federal control
because of their national effects. It argued that Congress's commerce
power extends to matters, including civil rights legislation, that inter-
fere with state law "for the purpose of executing some of the general
' See supra notes 218, 220. This is due in par to pervasive gender discrimination in state
prosecutorial and judicial systems that makes it exceedingly difficult to enforce nonfederal
remedies. See Crimes of Vlence Mothfated t, Gender Hearing Before the Sulvamm. on Card mid Const-
tuional Rights of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 103d Cong. 9 (1993) ("women bringing tort
actions for sexual assault are routinely subjected to intrusive questions about consensual sexual
activity unrelated to the attack."); Violence Against lWomen: Victims of tIe Syttem: Heanng on & 13
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 147 (1991) (testimony of Gill S. Freeman. Chair,
Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Commission) (revealing that in Florida state attorneys of-
ten refuse to file charges in cases of gender-motivated violence due to bias inherent in the
criminal justice system); Women and iolence: Hearing Before the S Comm. on the Judiry Part I
101" Cong. 65 (1990) (statement of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund) (reporting that
state task forces on gender bias determined that state court judges often disbeliee female vic-
tims "unless there is visible evidence of severe physical injury"); S. REP. No. 103.138. at 49
(1993) ("Women often face barriers of law, of practice, and of prejudice not suffered by other
victims of discrimination... Traditional State law sources of protection have proved to be diffi-
cult avenues of redress for some of the most serious crimes against woomen.'): S. REP. No. 102-
197, at 47 n.63 (1991) ("[A]ilmost one quarter of the (state judges] believed that rape victims
.sometimes' or 'frequently' precipitate their sexual assaults because of what they wear and/or
actions preceding the incidents."); id. at 43 ("Study after study commissioned by the highest
courts of the States-from Florida to New York, California to New Jersey, Nevada to Minne-
sota-has concluded that crimes disproportionately affecting wonen are often treated less seri-
ously than comparable crimes against men."); id. at 39 ("Despite States' most fenent efforts at
legislative reform, these stereotypes [of women] persist and continue to distort the criminal
justice system's response to violence against women.").
See Goldscheid, supra note 169, at 120 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae State of Arizona. et al.
in Support of Petitioners, United States v. Morrison, 120 S. CL 1740 (2000)).
See Goldscheid, supra note 169, at 134 ("Viewing the [VAWA's] civil rights remedy in the
context of other federal civil rights legislation [in Heart of Atlanta and MtClung], the Court's
conclusion that upholding the law would eliminate the distinction beteen national and local
authority seems particularly misplaced.").
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241. 259 (1964).
See idL at 260 (justifying Title II in light of the existence of numerous sitularhl valid state
anti-discrimination laiws).
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powers of government."23 2 In sum, both the specific circumstances
surrounding the VAWA's enactment and Supreme Court precedent
regarding civil rights statutes indicate that the VAWA did not inap-
propriately interfere with state lawmaking authority, but instead pro-
vided desperately needed federal relief from widespread civil rights
violations. Nevertheless, the Court in Morrison overlooked the
VAWA's social significance as a civil rights statute and struck it down
primarily for its failure to regulate "economic" activity.
2
I
If the Court refuses to recognize the difference between a federal
civil rights statute designed to combat proven prejudices and a crimi-
nal provision outlawing the possession of a firearm near a school, it
will likely end up eradicating federal power to participate in either
area. This will not only protect existing principles of state autonomy
in certain areas of the law, but also will fashion new standards of state
governance that will effectively preclude future federal protection of
disadvantaged minorities. The majority in Morrison struck down the
VAWA for allegedly violating elusive principles of noninterference in
state lawmaking and thereby eliminated an important source of fed-
eral authority-only the Lopez Court's nature-of-the-regulated-activity
categorization survives as a legitimate and potentially effective source
of federal commerce legislation.
A number of alternative constructions of the VAWA's civil rights
remedy may still survive constitutional scrutiny after Morrison, but
they are likely to include vastly limited protections for victims of gen-
der-motivated violence. Ajurisdictional element, limiting application
of the statute to acts involving interstate travel by either the parties or
other instrumentalities of the crime, may satisfy the Court's concerns
about preserving the federal-state balance. Similarly, limiting the
VAWA's application to places of public accommodation may satisfy
the Court's economic activity requirement.2 6 Finally, indirect ap-
proaches such as combating the economic barriers encountered by
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964) (upholding Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 as a permissible and important exercise of congressional authority).
See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994) (finding that gender-motivated vio-
lence is a widespread problem that greatly affects women's abilities to function normally in
modern society, and therefore "substantially affects interstate commerce"); S. REP. No. 103-138,
at 54 (1993) ("Gender-based crimes and the fear of gender-based crimes restricts movement,
reduces employment opportunities, increases health expenditures, and reduces consumer
spending, all of which affect interstate commerce and the national economy."); Goldscheid,
supra note 169, at 130 ("The Court's concerns about the implications of upholding the VAWA
civil rights remedy are simply inapplicable when the statute is viewed as a civil rights law.").
See United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2000) (striking down the VAWA be-
cause "[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic ac-
tivity"); Goldscheid, supra note 169, at 123 ("Although it declined to adopt a categorical rule
against aggregating the effects of noneconomic activity.., the [Morrison] Court effectively cre-
ated the categorical rule it expressly disclaimed.").
" See Goldscheid, supra note 169, at 137-38 (discussing alternate constructions of the VAWA
civil rights remedy that have been proposed in light of Morison).
See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1775-76 (BreyerJ., dissenting).
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victims of gender-motivated violence may survive Commerce Clause
review.s1 Regardless of the potential success of any of these ap-
proaches, however, it appears that Morrison stands for the proposition
that civil rights laws offering the broadest protections, those aimed at
non-economic, intrastate acts of discrimination, are for the time be-
ing outside the bounds of congressional commerce authority. - ' This
limiting of congressional power may doom a variety of current and
future federal regulation,0 9 while simultaneously ushering in a new
era of imposed autonomy for the states: "federalism whether they
want it or not."20
H1I. THE FUTURE OF CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION AFTER MORRISON
This restrictive interpretation of the new Commerce Clause doc-
trine-that statutes regulating intrastate, non-economic activity will
not survive constitutional scrutiny-appeared again this term in the
environmental context in Solid Waste Agency v. United States Arny Corps
of Engineers-24' The Court refrained, however, from deciding the con-
stitutional issue.42 This leaves open the question of whether other
non-civil-rights regulations of intrastate, non-economic activity will
face the same restrictive constitutional scrutiny used to strike down
the VAWA in MorrisonL24 If the Supreme Court upholds such regula-
tions, it will represent a sharp break from Morrison, which overturned
the VAWA because it found gender-motivated violence to be local
and noncommercial in nature.2 4 Such a break from precedent may
threaten federal civil rights laws even more seriously than Momison.
If, however, the Court extends Morrison to statutes outside the civil
rights realm, we believe it will create a situation so untenable in mod-
em American society that it will likely inspire a wholesale doctrinal
reevaluation. This type of reevaluation may be the only plausible way
See Goldscheid, supra note 169, at 138.
See, eg., Baker, supra note 207, at 1193 (stating that Monison "casts constitutional doubt on
much of federal criminal law, and especially on federal crimes tied to motivation, of which 'hate
crimes' are a species").
See, eg., 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c) (2001) (challenged in Gibbs v. Babbitt. 214 F.3d 483 (4th
Cir. 1999)); Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999, S. 622, 106th Cong. (1999).
2, Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1773 (Souter, J., dissenting); see i& at 1768 (Souter.J.. dissenting)
(arguing that the Court's decision to strike the VAWA %a-s adopted becatse of its %,lue "in serv-
ing a conception of federalism .... The legitimacy of the Court's current emphasis on the non-
commercial nature of regulated activity, then, does not turn on any logic serving tie text of the
Commerce Clause .... The essential issue is rather the strength of the majority's claim to have
a constitutional w-arrant for its current conception of a federal relationship enforceable bv this
Court through limits on otherwise plenary commerce power.").
'4 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001).
I& at 678 (answering the question of whether § 404(a) extends to %,nters covcred b% the
migratory bird rule "in the negative," thereby permitting the court to "not reach the second"
question regarding the rule's constitutionality under the Commerce Clatnew.
120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
See supra Part ll.B.
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to salvage federal anti-discrimination law after Morrison.
A. Recent Developments
Two recent decisions, Solid Waste Agenc' 5 and Gibbs v. Babbitt," '
provide insight into the arguments likely to be presented to the Su-
preme Court in future cases involving the constitutionality of federal
environmental legislation. Solid Waste Agency presented two separate
issues involving the applicability of the Clean Water Act ("CWA")1 7 to
intrastate ponds under the so-called "migratory bird rule":248 whether
the migratory bird rule gave the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps")
jurisdiction over non-navigational, isolated, intrastate ponds, and, al-
ternatively, whether Congress possessed the authority under the
Commerce Clause to grant the Corps such jurisdiction..2 " The Court
decided the case on the merits of the first issue, the jurisdictional
scope of the regulation, and avoided the constitutional question.2' °
Recognizing its doctrine of deference to administrative policymak-
ing,5 the Court nevertheless found the relevant section of the CWA
to be "clear... [such that] we would not extend Chevron deference
here."252 The Court went on to explain that it retains a "prudent[]
desire not to needlessly reach constitutional issues,"2  and concluded
that "[w]e thus read the statute as written to avoid the significant
constitutional and federalism questions raised by respondents' inter-
pretation, and therefore reject the request for administrative defer-
ence. We hold that... the 'Migratory Bird Rule' exceeds the author-
ity granted to respondents under § 404(a) of the CWA." 254
Although it did not base its ruling on the Commerce Clause chal-
lenge to § 404(a), the Court did indicate that the statute was also
infirm in that regard after Morrison. It referred to the Commerce
" 121 S. Ct. 675 (2001).
M 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1081 (2001).
... Clean Water Act § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
2, The "migratory bird rule" interprets the Clean Water Act as extending to intrastate waters:
.a. Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird Treaties; or b.
Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state lines." Solid
Waste Agency, 121 S. Ct. at 678 (citing 51 Fed. Reg. 41217).
" See id. at 677-78.
See id. at 678 ("We answer the first question in the negative and therefore do not reach the
second.").
"'" See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984)
("When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized,
really centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable
choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal
judges-who have no constituency-have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by
those who do.").
Solid Waste Ageny, 121 S. Ct. at 683.
' Id.
Id. at 684 (citations omitted).
See id.
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Clause questions raised by § 404(a) as "serious constitutional prob-
lems," reiterating that its last two constructions of the Commerce
Clause emphasized the fact that Congress's authority, "though broad,
is not unlimited."6 The Court went on to address the government's
argument, based on the Supreme Court's prior holding in Missouri v.
Hollande' that the protection of miratory birds is a "national interest
of very nearly the first magnitude," ' as well as its contentions that the
presence of migratory birds substantially affects interstate com-
merce25 and that the activity associated with creating landfills is eco-
nomic in nature.2
The Court appeared to rely on its reasoning in Morrison in dismiss-
ing each of the government's proffered arguments. Reluctant to spe-
cifically discredit its prior holding in Holland, the Solid Waste Agency
Court nevertheless expressed its concern that permitting federal
regulation under the migratory bird rule would interfere with the
states' traditional dominion over land and water use. ' The Court
also expressed reservations about the government's conclusions that
the protection of migratory birds has, in the aggregate, a substantial
effect on interstate commerce, and that landfills represent economic
activity. In order to evaluate the validity of these contentions, the
Court explained it would have to evaluate the "precise object or activ-
ity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce,"
and it implied that it would not be inclined to consider the subject
matter of § 404(a) economic in nature "' In short, despite its techni-
cal avoidance of the constitutional issue, the Court in Solid Waste
Agency signaled that it would preserve Morrison's restrictive reading of
the Commerce Clause outside the civil rights arena by striking regula-
tions of intrastate, non-economic activity.
2 Id. at 683 (citing United States v. Morrison, 120 S. CL 1740 (2000); United States v. Lopez.
514 U.S. 549 (1995)).
2 7 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
Solid WasteAgeny, 121 S. Ct. at 683 (citing Holland, 252 U.S. at -35).
See Brief for Respondents at 47-48, Solid Waste Agency v. United States rnny Corps of En-
gineers, (No. 99-1178) (U.S.Jan. 9, 2000) ("Migratory birds are the object of hunting activities
that generate billions of dollars of commerce each year. In 1996. 3.1 million people hunted
migratory birds and spent $1.3 billion doing so .... iUke bird bunting, bird watching annually
generates several billion dollars of commerce. In 1996 some 62.9 million Americans spent $29
billion on wildlife-watching activities, including bird -atching.' (citations omitted)).
See id. at 43 (-The proposed activity for which petitioner sought a federal pemmit... is
plainly of a commercial nature.").
'6' See Solid Waste Ageny, 121 S. Ct. at 684 ("Permitting respondents to claim federal jurisdic-
tion over ponds and mudflats falling within the 'Migratory Bird Rule' would result in a signifi-
cant impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over land and water use.-): me
also Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 US. 30. 44 (1994) ('[Rjegulation of land use
[is] a function traditionally performed by local governments.").
Solid Waste Ageng, 121 S. Ct. at 683.
See id. ("[R]espondents now, post liten ofan, focus upon the fact that the regulated activ-
ity is petitioner's municipal landfill, which is 'plainly of a commercial nature.' But this is a far
cry, indeed, from the 'navigable waters' and 'waters of the United States' to %% ich the statute by
its terms extends." (citations omitted)).
May 2001]
JOURNAL OF CONS TITUTIONAL LA IV
Solid Waste Agency remains somewhat (albeit slightly) inconclusive,
however, as a forecast of exactly what lies in store for interstate com-
merce regulation, because it did not rely for its ultimate disposition
on the constitutionality of § 404(a). This uncertainty also pervades
the Fourth Circuit's recent decision in Gibbs v. Babbitt,&l which up-
held a regulation associated with the Endangered Species Act
("ESA"), 50 C.F.R. § 17 .84(c), against a Commerce Clause challenge.
Gibbs offers a detailed analysis of Congress's commerce power in the
wake of Morrison. Although the Court in Solid Waste Agency indicated
that it would follow Morrison in future commerce cases, many of the
justifications relied on by the Fourth Circuit in upholding § 17 .84(c)
are directly at odds with the Morrison Court's rationale for striking
down the VAWA. Thus, despite recently being denied certiorari,
Gibbs represents an alternative approach to non-civil rights commerce
legislation that could create a kind of doctrinal double-standard for
analyzing the constitutionality of federal civil rights laws and that, in
turn, could endanger such laws' future survival.
Gibbs upheld a regulation associated with the ESA that prohibited
the "taking" of a red wolf on private property except in limited cir-
cumstances. 65 The regulation was directly at odds with a North Caro-
lina statute and was challenged for being outside the bounds of the
commerce power.2 ' The Gibbs court relied on a number of rationales
in upholding the regulation, from declaring preservation of the red
wolf an economic activity 67 and recogizing the "close connection"
between preservation and commerce,6n to claiming that principles of
federalism required congressional intervention in an area of federal
expertise and of such grave national importance as conservation, 26"1 to
finding that the ESA is part of a complex federal regulatory scheme
that, as a whole, satisfies commerce scrutiny.Y The inconsistencies
214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1081 (2001).
See 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c) (4) (i)-(iv).
Section 17 .84(c) allows a person to take red wolves on private land '[p]rovided that such
taking is not intentional or willful, or is in defense of that person's own life or the lives of
others.' Private landowners may also take red wolves on their property 'when the wolves
are in the act of killing livestock or pets, [pirovided that freshly wounded or killed live-
stock or pets are evident....' A landowner may also 'harass red wolves found on his or
her property ... [pirovided that all such harassment is by methods that are not lethal or
physically injurious to the red wolf....'
Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 488-89.
See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 489 ("[Appellants] seek a declaration that the anti-taking regulation,
50 C.F.R. § 17 .84(c) ... exceeds Congress's power under the interstate Commerce Clause." (ci-
tations omitted)).
"' See id. at 492.
' See id. at 493.
See id. at 500-01 (stating that conservation is "an appropriate and well-recognized area of
federal regulation," as well as a "'matter of the sharpest exigency for national well being'"
(quotingJustice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432-33 (1920))).
° See id. at 497 ("This regulation [§ 17.84 (c)] is also sustainable as 'an essential part of a
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless
the intrastate activity were regulated.'" (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561
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between the reasoning employed in Gibbs and the Supreme Court's
ruling in Morrison are stark.
The Fourth Circuit first found support for upholding the ESA
regulation in the fact that "economic activity [in the context of
Commerce Clause analysis] must be understood in broad terms." ' It
went on to explain that it was reasonable for Congress to conclude
that § 17.84(c) regulates economic activity, finding that the "protec-
tion of commercial and economic assets is a primary reason for tak-
ing the wolves" and that the "relationship between red wolf takings
and interstate commerce is quite direct." The court relied on the
Wickard aggregation principle to account for its finding that such a
small number of red wolves could substantially affect interstate com-275
merce. By contrast, the Morrison Court specifically rejected
Wzckards aggregation doctrine.' 4 It relied instead on a finding that,
despite both voluminous congressional findings to the contrarV1 and
prior determinations that farming and the provision of public ac-
commodations are commercial in nature, " "[g]ender-motivated
crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activ-
ity."27 Indeed, the Court's holding in Morrison seems more akin to a
statement of the dissenting opinion in Gibbs-
[It]he killing of even all 41 of the estimated red wolves that live on private
property in North Carolina would not constitute an economic activity of
the kind held by the Court in Lopez and in Monrison to be of central con-
cern to the Commerce Clause, if it could be said to constitute an eco-
nomic activity at all.2'8
The Gibbs court next concluded that, even if the taking of red
wolves does not amount to an economic activity, the practice is
"closely connected to a variety of interstate economic activities" and
for that reason satisfies constitutional scrutiny under Lopez and Morri-979
son. ' It found that tourism connected to public appreciation of the
(1995))).
Id. at 491.
Id. at 492. Cf A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States. 295 U.S. 195, 5-18 1935)
(distinguishing between "direct" and "indirect" effects on commerce): Hlaunmer %. Dagenhart.
247 U.S. 251,276 (1918) (same).
See id. at 493 ("Because the taking of red wolhvs can be seen as economic activi ... the
individual takings may be aggregated for the purpose of Commerce Clause mah'sis.').
" See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1754 ("We accordingly reject the argument that Congress mna,
regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect
on interstate commerce.").
See, eg., Crimes of riolence Motivated I Gender Heanng Before the Sulkomm. on Cmd and Caot-
tutionalRights ofthe House Comm. on theJudiciay; 103d Cong. 5 (1993); H.R. Co.F. REP. No. 1)3-
711, at 385-86 (1994); S. REP. No. 101-545, at 43 (1990).
"' See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1750 (citing 1idtard t. ilbum, Katkebarld to. M Uung, and Heard
of Atlanta Hote, Inc. v. United States as cases involving the regulation of economic activity under
the Commerce Clause).
Morison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751.
Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 507 (LuttigJ., dissenting).
Id. at 493.
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red wolf would be hampered if takings were not regulated,"' and de-
termined that scientific research involving red wolves and the "possi-
bility of a renewed trade in fur pelts" would be disadvantaged if the
animals' welfare was not federally protected. "8' Finally, the court con-
cluded that Congress may "balance economic effects-namely
whether the negative effects on interstate commerce from red wolf
predation are outweighed by the benefits to commerce from a resto-
ration of this species."22  By sharp contrast, the Court in Morrison
struck down the VAWA on the basis of nearly identical arguments re-
garding the effects of gender-motivated violence on interstate com-
merce. The VAWA's supporters argued that, consistent with formal
congressional findings, violence motivated by a victim's gender frus-
trates interstate tourism and travel as well as business transactions and
employment."3 The Court, however, rejected these arguments, find-
ing that such a tenuous relationship with interstate commerce was in-
sufficient to survive constitutional scrutiny under the Commerce
Clause.284
The Fourth Circuit's third rationale for upholding § 17 .84(c) fo-
cused, at least in part, on the comprehensiveness of the ESA's regula-
tory scheme. The court cited Hodel v. Indiana s for the proposition
that not every aspect of a complex federal regulatory program need
satisfy the commerce doctrine for the legislation to pass constitu-
tional muster.86 If regulations are considered an integral part of a
larger legislative scheme, they may be upheld in the interest of main-
taining that scheme's viability and effectiveness. This includes regu-
See id. ("The first nexus between the challenged regulation and interstate commerce is
tourism.").
"' See id. at 494-95 ("The regulation of red wolf takings is also closely connected to ... scien-
tific research .... [Section 17 .84(c)] is also connected to... the possibility of a renewed trade
in fur pelts.").
Id. at 495.
" See Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 5 (1993) ("Fear of gender-based vio-
lence deters women's free movement interstate, and limits every economic choice, including
education, employment, and travel."); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385-86 (1994) ("Crimes
of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on interstate commerce, by
deterring potential victims from travelling interstate, from engaging in employment in inter-
state business, and from transacting with business... in interstate commerce."); S. REP. No.
101-545, at 43 (1990) ("Gender-based crimes and the fear of gender-based crimes restricts
movement, reduces employment opportunities, increases health expenditures, and reduces
consumer spending, all of which affect interstate commerce and the national economy.").
See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751 ("We rejected th[is] ... 'national productivity' argument[]
because ... under this but-for reasoning: 'Congress could regulate any activity that it found was
related to the economic productivity of individual citizens... [and therefore] it is difficult to
perceive any limitation on federal power.... '").
452 U.S. 314 (1981).
See id. at 329 n.17 ("A complex regulatory program.., can survive a Commerce Clause
challenge without a showing that every single facet of the program is independently and di-
rectly related to a valid congressional goal. It is enough that the challenged provisions are an
integral part of the regulatory program and that the regulatory scheme when considered as a
whole satisfies this test.").
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lations of intrastate activity.7 The Gibbs court argued that the ESA
was just such a broad regulatory scheme. Because it was designed to
"conserve the health of our national emironment," the court found
that Congress must have authority to protect endangered species,
suggesting that the "specific needs of individual species... present a
classic case for legislative balancing."2s The Court in Morrison, how-
ever, rejected this line of reasoning with respect to the VANWA, find-
ing that there was no complex federal regulatory scheme addressing
gender-related violence, but rather that the VAWA was a single legis-
lative attempt to regulate a private, intrastate, non-economic activity
that is traditionally within the purview of the states. On this score
then, a comparison of Gibbs and Morrison intimates that, because
much civil rights legislation develops in a "piecemeal" fashion, spe-
cific civil rights provisions will rarely benefit as a part of a complex
regulatory scheme. These provisions therefore appear all the more
vulnerable to the emerging Commerce Clause doctrine.
"
The court in Gibbs next explained that § 17.84(c) w-as valid be-
cause it was consistent with principles of federal noninterference in
areas of traditional state concern. Although it recognized the states'
traditional power over land use, the court made clear that "State con-
trol over wildlife... is circumscribed by federal regulatory power,"',
See id
Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 497-98 ("The FWS issued this regulation pursuant to the provisions of
the Endangered Species Act, a comprehensive and far-reaching piece of legislation that aims to
conserve the health of our national environment. Congress undoubtedly has the constitutional
authority to pass legislation for the conservation of endangered species.').
See Monison, 120 S. CL at 1752 n.5 (recognizing that the civil rights reined) of the VAWA
is part of a larger statute addressing gender-related violence, but failing to categorize the entire
statute as a comprehensive regulatory scheme designed to combat such violence); id. at 1754
("We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent crimi-
nal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce.... The
regulation and punishment of intrastate violence... has awuas been the province of the
States.").
29 This point can be seen by noting the many distinct provisions and remedies incorporated
into the VAWA. The VAWA %eas specifically designed to be an entirely self-sufficient. compre-
hensive approach to remedying gender discrimination. In addition to the civil rights remedy
provision, § 13981, the statute provided for capital improvements to public transportation sys-
tems. See 42 U.S.C. § 13931(a) (2000) ("There is authorized to be appropriated not to exceed
$10,000,000, for the Secretary of Transportation ... to make capital grants for the prevention of
crime and to increase security in existing and future public transportation systens.-). Title I1.
the Safe Homes for Women Act, required full faith and credit for protective orders issued I
other states. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (2000). The statute also included the Eqtial Justice for
Women in the Courts Act, which provides for studies -on the nature and extent of gender bias
in the federal courts, as well as for training of state and federal judges on the issues of sexual
assault and domestic violence." Martin, supra note 189, at 255 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 139M2. 14001
(1994)). Finally, the VAWA includes a criminal provision that presents a federal remedy for
crimes of abuse committed in interstate travel or by virtue of travel across state lines. Sre IS
U.S.C. § 2261 (a) (1)-(2) (2000). The breadth of the VAWA's reach nakes it difficult to imagine
what sort of regulatory scheme Congress would have to devise in order to draft a civil rights
statute that the Court would find satisfies the standard articulated in Hodr) it Indima.
' Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 499.
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and that "endangered wildlife regulation has not been an exclusive or
primary state function."2 It also relied on what it deemed the his-
torical federal interest in conservation. 3 The Court then distin-
guished § 17.84(c) from the provisions at issue in Lopez and Morrison
by contrasting gun possession and gender-motivated violence with the
conservation of natural resources, a practice the court considered "an
appropriate and well-recognized area of federal regulation." " Gibbs
concluded by finding that § 17 .84(c) was not an impermissible intru-
sion into an area of traditional state concern because of the over-
whelming need for national environmental standards and due to the
importance of encouraging congressional efforts to devise more ef-
fective solutions to significant national problems.295 The Supreme
Court, however, rejected these same justifications in Morrison. The
Morrison Court disregarded the fact that civil rights legislation is an
area of traditional federal involvement. 6 It instead concluded that
gender-motivated violence, although clearly defined and intended by
Congress to represent a widespread discriminatory phenomenon,2
was not a problem of national scope deserving national attention. '
The Court came to this conclusion despite the specific request of At-
torneys General from thirty-eight states for federal help in protecting
women from such violence,2 three-quarters of the states joining in
Id. at 500.
Id. at 501 ("The Supreme Court has recognized that protection of natural resources may
require action from Congress.... States may decide to forego or limit conservation efforts in
order to lower... [implementation] costs, and other states may be forced to follow suit in or-
der to compete."); see also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
281-82 (1981) (deferring to congressional finding that nationwide criteria were "essential" to
insuring environmental standards).
Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 500.
' See id. at 502 ("[Ulltimate responsibility for the red wolf lies with the federal govern-
ment.").
' See Goldscheid, supra note 169, at 129 ("The [Morrison] Court ignored arguments, fully
supported by the legislative record, that Congress sought to regulate a matter of civil rights, an
area in which the federal government has a strong historic and enduring interest."); see also
Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993) (finding that discriminatory conduct "is
thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm" than other crimes); Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 348 (1993) (O'Connor,J., dissenting) (noting the federal
interests in remedying class-based discriminatory conduct).
' See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994) ("[C]rimes of violence motivated by
gender have a substantial effect on interstate commerce."); H.R. REP. No. 103-395, at 25 (1993)
("Three out of four American women will be victims of violent crimes sometime during their
life."); S. REP. No. 101-545, at 33 (1990) ("Partial estimates show that violent crime against
women costs this country at least 3 billion-not million, but billion-dollars a year.").
See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1752-53 (stating that "the existence of congressional findings is
not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation," and
that passage of the VAWA is inappropriate because "if Congress may regulate gender-motivated
violence, it would be able to regulate murder or any other type of violence since gender-
motivated violence, as a subset of all violent crime, is certain to have lesser economic impacts
than the larger class of which it is a part").
See Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1772-73 (Souter, J., dissenting) (observing that "Attorneys Gen-
eral from 38 States urged Congress to enact the Civil Rights Remedy").
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an amici curiae brief in support of the VAWA,"'' and voluminous
congressional findings outlining the scope of the problem and the
inability of states to deal with it themselves."'
The Gibbs court finally justified upholding the red wolf regulation
by explaining that, unlike the GFSZA or VAWA, the regulation did
not interfere with existing state law." The court cited examples to
demonstrate that the regulation was not supplanting existing state
law, but was part of a scheme of "cooperative federalism" designed to
encourage federal and state teamwork and collective problem solv-
ing3 s It likewise found that restricting the regulation to only "en-
dangered" or "threatened" species served to limit any potential fed-
eral intrusions into established state lwv. 2" The court finally argued
in the negative, citing as support for the regulation the fact that limit-
ing federal regulatory power to federal lands would "place in peril
the entire federal regulatory scheme for wildlife and natural resource
conservation." s30 This rationale is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's holding in Morrison. While § 17.84(c) %as upheld for respect-
ing state authority within the context of its federal regulatory scheme,
the VAWA was struck down despite incorporating similar "coopera-
tive federalism" ideals. The VAWA adopted state law definitions of
crimes of violence as part of its identification of "crimes of violence
motivated by gender"37 and explicitly reserved crimes of family and
domestic violence for state control "  Moreover, it provided a federal
civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence, thereby sup-
plementing existing state criminal laws by offering a form of relief
previously unavailable in state courts."
' See Goldscheid, supra note 169, at 120 n.62 (citing Brief of Anici Curiae State of Arizona.
etal. in Support of Petitioners, United States v. Morrison. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2tIJU INos. 99-5. 911w
29)).
'0' See Goldscheid, supra note 169, at 117-20.
See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 503 ("Unlike the GFSZA and the V\\AA. § 17.84(c) does not duph-
cate or supplement state and local regulation.").
"Congress, however, did not simply sweep away the role of the states bv enacting a na-
tional solution to the problem of red wolf conservation. The ESAand § 17.84(c) eanbod, pnn-
ciples of cooperative federalism and seek to involve the states in the conservation effort....
First, a species is listed as endangered or threatened only after reviening 'thos elforts. if is,
being made by any State... to protect such species. Second, once the species hias recoered
and is 'delisted,' management responsibility will return to the states." Id. (citing Endangered
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(b) (1) (A), 1532(3)) (internal citations omitted).
*1 Seei.
Id. at 504.
See Biden, supra note 183, at 11 ("iT]lie civil rights remedy w,s careltlh crafted ti the
very best spirit of cooperative federalism.").
" See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d) (2) (A) (1994) (defining "crines of violence' -s. among other
things, those that "come within the meaning of State... offenses").
See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(e) (4) (1994) (excepting from coverage clams seeking the esLib-
lishment of a divorce, alimony, equitable distribution of marital property. or child cttstod% de-
cree").
SeeS. REP. No. 103-138, at 48 n.47 (1993) (reporting that prior to the VAWVA's enacuinent.
only ten states had hate crime laws that included crimes motivated b% gender): Biden. supra
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B. Potential Consequences
Nearly all of Gibbs's justifications for sustaining § 17.84(c) conflict
with the Supreme Court's most recent application of Commerce
Clause doctrine in Morrison. The Court, however, recently denied
certiorari in Gibbs and has postponed consideration of this conflict
for another day. If the Court eventually adopts the Fourth Circuit's
reasoning and sustains regulations like § 17 .84(c), Morrison will then
appear to stand for the disturbing proposition that civil rights laws
are to be scrutinized more strictly than other federal, particularly en-
vironmental, regulations.3 '0 This result will cripple any future federal
efforts to pass badly needed civil rights laws s'" by "pigeon-holing" such
note 183, at 26 ("[Section] 13981 responds to the states' self-described needs without preempt-
ing or interfering with state prosecutions in any way.").
30 This temptation to distinguish the VAWA and civil rights statutes generally from other
Commerce Clause legislation is apparent in the Government's brief in Solid Waste Agency.
Counsel for the Government took great pains to portray Monison as a decision tailored to civil
rights legislation, and the VAWA as an imposition on state sovereignty different from that posed
by statutes in other areas of the law. See Brief for the Federal Respondents at 38, Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers (7th Cir. 2000)
(No. 99-1178) (arguing that the "federal law[] struck down in [Monison] w[asl intended to ftr-
ther governmental interests.., the 'suppression of violent crime'-that have as an historical
matter been principally entrusted to the States."); id. at 41 ("[T]he destruction of migratory
bird habitat presents no danger that 'Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely
obliterate the Constitution's distinction between national and local authority.'" (quoting Alomi-
son, 120 S. Ct. at 1752)).
" An example of such pending federal civil rights legislation is the Hate Crimes Prevention
Act ("HCPA"), which is broader in scope but nonetheless similar to the VAWA, as it creates a
federal (albeit criminal) penalty for
Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, willfully causes bodily injury to any
person... because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, or national origin of
any person ... [or] religion, gender, sexual orientation, or disability of any person ...
[if] the offense is in or affects interstate orforeign comnerce
See Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 1999, S. 622, 106th Cong. § 4(c) (1999) (emphasis added).
Like it did in enacting the VAWA, Congress made formal findings in support of its exercise of
the commerce power to enact the HCPA, concluding that
(1) the incidence of violence motivated by... gender.., poses a serious national prob-
lem;
(2) such violence disrupts the tranquility and safety of communities...;
(3) existing Federal law is inadequate to address this problem;
(4) such violence affects interstate commerce in many ways, including.., impeding the
movement of members ... across State lines ... and ... preventing members of targeted
groups from purchasing goods and services, obtaining or sustaining employment or par-
ticipating in other commercial activity;
(5) perpetrators cross State lines to commit such violence;
(6) instrumentalities of interstate commerce are used to facilitate... such violence;
(7) such violence is committed using articles that have traveled in interstate commerce;
(8) violence motivated by bias ... can constitute badges and incidents of slavery;
(9) ... Federal jurisdiction over certain violent crimes motivated by bias is necessary to
supplement State and local jurisdiction... ;
(10) Federal jurisdiction over certain crimes motivated by bias enables Federal, State,
and local authorities to work together... ;
(11) the problem of hate crime is sufficiently serious, widespread, and interstate in na-
ture as to warrant Federal assistance to States and local jurisdictions.
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legislation as outside congressional commerce authority.
By contrast, if the Court remains consistent and overturns non-
civil rights legislation like § 17.84(c) because it regulates non-
economic activity, the trend developed in Morrison ill remain uni-
versal. Although this results, in our opinion, in an unfortunate out-
come for the immediate future of federal commerce legislation, it
creates a more optimistic long-term view for the protection of civil
rights. If the Supreme Court applies a less arduous standard to non-
civil rights legislation than it did to the federal civil rights law in Mor-
rison, Morrison would have to be specifically overturned before Con-
gress could legislate in the civil rights arena. If, however, all com-
merce legislation is treated with the same restrictive scrutiny applied
in Morrison, the resulting situation would resemble that immediately
preceding NLRB v. Jones & Lauglin Steel Corp.,1"2 and likely cause the
Court to reevaluate its recent Commerce Clause decisions. Limiting
Congress's power so severely as to preclude it from enacting, at a
minimum, civil rights and environmental legislation would create a
situation so contrary to the needs and expectations of our modem,
national society that the Court will quickly be forced to reevaluate its
approach for the clear benefit of the country.t s
Id. at § 2. Both Congress's purpose and cited justifications for enacting the HCPA are nearly
identical to those relied on unsuccessfully in Monison to uphold die VAWA. and uill therefore
likely be considered insufficient to uphold the HCPA against a similar Commerce Clause chal-
lenge. See Baker, supra note 207, at 1220 ('After the 'one-tvo punch' of ,lomson. it would seem
a federal 'hate crime' is constitutionally doomed."). Although this serves as only one example
of the potential impact of Monison on future civil rights legislation, it is a rather clear depiction
of Monitson's severe limitation of federal legislative authority.
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
"5 At least one commentator believes that the future of civil rights legislation is more dearly
represented by United States v. Aelson, No. 98-1437, a case argued before the Second Circuit on
January 9, 2001. SeeJeffrey Ghannam, Sering Up Civil RighLs. 87 A.BAJ. 44 (Feb. 2001). Velson
involves a Commerce Clause challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 245. a criminal statute making it 'unlawful
to use force willfully to injure a person because of race or religion and because that person is
enjoying a facility provided or administered by a subdivision of the state, as in a public side-
walk." See id. at 48. Martin Karlinsky, chair of the Anti-Defamation League's national legal af-
fairs committee, stated that the issue in Nelson "very directly threatens the heart of civil rights
protections in America. If Section 245 were held to be an unconstitutional exercise of congres-
sional power in light of this new reading of the commerce clause, then the federal government
will have lost one of its principal remedies to protect civil rights of all Jnericans." Id.
Both Ghannam and Karlinsky's focus on the potential impact of ,\dson is somiehat mis-
placed, because the Supreme Court already made it virtually impossible for Congress to pass
civil rights legislation when it struck down the VAWA in Momson for regulating a non-economic
activity. Furthermore, § 245 does not accurately represent the vast majority of federal civil
rights legislation. By virtue of the fact that § 245 is a criminal provision and is limited in its cov-
erage to areas "provided or administered by a subdivision of the state," it unavoidably interferes
in areas of traditional state control in a ay most other civil rights statutes do not. See supra Part
IIA.2. In short, § 245 represents an easy case for the Court's activist conservative majority to
strike down federal commerce legislation. As a result. even if the Supreme Court were to grant
certiorari and invalidate the statute, such a gesture would not automatically spell doom for
broader civil rights regulations. More importantly, it is our contention that the future of civil
rights legislation is not to be determined by another case involving similar legislation, but
rather by the Supreme Court's application of its Momson rationale to other areas of federal law.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The jurisprudential history of the Commerce Clause includes a
variety of doctrinal trends that have moved in and out of prominence
under varying administrations and social conditions. The Supreme
Court recently revived some old trends in United States v. Morrison,
when it struck down § 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act and
ostensibly eliminated congressional commerce authority over any in-
trastate, non-economic activity. The Court reviewed a similar statute
this term in Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,
but avoided applying Morrison by resolving the case on non-
constitutional grounds. It similarly avoided interpreting Morrison by
denying certiorari in Gibbs. The Court remains faced, therefore, with
an important question regarding the future of federal civil rights leg-
islation: do federal civil rights statutes interfere in areas of law tradi-
tionally reserved for the state in ways other federal regulations of
non-economic activity do not? Answering this question in the af-
firmative will single out civil rights laws as being uniquely beyond the
scope of Congress's commerce power, thereby making it virtually im-
possible to enact such legislation without explicitly overturning Woi-
son. Alternatively, if the Court finds that all federal regulations of
non-economic activity are equally precluded by the Constitution's
limitations on congressional power, then such a decision would so
violate social expectations and needs that it would likely require the
Court to turn to a different approach in order to define the com-
merce power in a way consistent with the four corners of the Consti-
tution and the pressing needs of a growing national and international
society.
It would seem much less remarkable for the Court to apply the Morrison rationale to what is ar-
guably an easier case involving another civil rights statute than for the Court to be forced to
decide whether it is willing to apply such a restrictive commerce doctrine to all federal laws en-
acted under the commerce power.
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